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Abstract
This Dissertation presents three studies on market discipline, implicit guar-
antees, sovereign risk and bank regulation. Chapter one analyzes whether
larger banks are deemed as Too Big to Save by analyzing their stock returns’
reaction to a set of announcements regarding governments’ bailout capacity.
In order to assess if there has been a risk transfer from banks to sovereigns
(due to implicit guarantees), chapter two analyzes the reaction of sovereign
bond spreads to downgrades on banks’ standalone ratings. Finally, chapter
three analyzes, from a theoretical perspective, the interaction between liq-
uidity and capital requirements, and their effect on bank risk-taking.
Esta tesis presenta tres estudios sobre temas relacionados con la disciplina
de mercado, seguros impl´ıcitos, riesgo soberano y regulacio´n bancaria. El
primer cap´ıtulo analiza si los bancos ma´s grandes pueden ser considerados
como Demasiado Grandes para Salvar. Pare ello se analiza la reaccio´n de los
rendimientos de las acciones de los bancos a un conjunto de anuncios rela-
cionados con la capacidad de rescate de los gobiernos. Con el fin de evaluar
si se ha producido una transferencia de riesgo de los bancos a los sobera-
nos (debido al seguro impl´ıcito), el segundo cap´ıtulo analiza la reaccio´n de
los bonos soberanos a rebajas en los ratings de los bancos. Por u´ltimo, el
tercer cap´ıtulo analiza, desde una perspectiva teo´rica, la interaccio´n entre la
liquidez y los requerimientos de capital, y su efecto sobre final la toma de
riesgos de los bancos.
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Introduction
The last financial crisis revealed several weaknesses in the European and
international regulatory architecture, while highlighting the relationship be-
tween banks and their national sovereigns.
Problems in the banking sector created significant complications for their
home sovereigns. Rescue packages and extensions of financial safety-nets for
banks, left many governments highly indebted. As a consequence, concerns
arose about the ability of governments to raise sufficient funds to bail out
banks. This might be particularly troublesome for larger banks located in
financially distressed countries as the would become Too Big to Save. These
are banks that are so large that governments are not able to manage a bailout.
The case of Iceland, with banks almost ten times as large as GDP, is a clear
example of this situation. The implications for regulatory policies, financial
stability and the consequences for taxpayers due to bailouts in distressed
economies make the subject an important problem.
Government intervention came at a cost since financial instability was
transfered from banks to their corresponding national sovereigns, leading to
the sovereign debt crisis. This link between banks and sovereigns (which im-
plies an increase in market fragmentation) is strengthened by the existence
of implicit guarantees. When markets expect massive bailouts on the finan-
cial sector, there is a subsequent transfer of risk to the national governments
(anticipating an increase in sovereign debt). Such was the case of Ireland
during the last financial crisis.
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Finally, the financial crisis exposed a significant gap in the regulatory
framework, i.e. the lack of a formal standard regulating liquidity. Despite
the highly developed structure on capital requirements, it was liquidity is-
sues that triggered runs on some banks. As a response to this weakness,
regulators have created a new set of liquidity requirements (i.e. Liquidity
Coverage Ratio or Net Stable Funding Ratio. Nevertheless, such standards
might be overlooking the potential effects that liquidity has on solvency risk.
In general, these regulatory tools have been analyzed in isolation, neglecting
the possibility of interactions in the optimal levels for the standards.
Throughout this Thesis I will try to address the aforementioned issues,
expanding the literature on regulation, implicit guarantees and the sovereign-
bank nexus.
In the first chapter entitled “Government Finances, Banks Bailouts and
Moral Hazard: Evidence from European Stock Markets” (coauthored with
Margarita Samart´ın and Gerald Dwyer) I explore the existence of Too Big to
Save banks.1 Using a sample of European listed banks and a series of events
affecting governments’ fiscal position, I performed an event study to assess if
there is a relationship between governments’ financial difficulties and banks’
stock returns. Such a relationship might be evidencing the existence of Too
Big to Save cases. Using this strategy, I find a significant reaction of banks’
stock returns to news concerning governments’ finances. Their returns fall in
response to a deterioration of governments’ financial situation. Nevertheless,
I find little difference in the reaction between large and small banks. The
bulk of the evidence points towards all banks in the sample being fairly likely
to be bailed out. It might be argued that during the sovereign debt crisis
“No Bank was Too Small to Save”.
1At the time when this Thesis was written, this chapter was under second round revision
in the Journal of Empirical Finance.
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In the second chapter of my Dissertation, “Risk transfer and implicit in-
surance: The effect of banks’ downgrades on sovereign debt”, I study the
sovereign-bank nexus and the risk transfer from banks to governments. Ana-
lyzing the reaction of sovereign bond spreads when banks’ standalone ratings
are downgraded, I assess and quantify the magnitude of this transfer. Such
downgrades are not related to governments’ capacity to bail out financial in-
termediaries, hence they can be seen as discrete increases in banks’ perceived
level of risk. Results show that downgrades lead to increases in sovereign
spreads. Consistent with the idea that risk transfer arises due to bailout
expectations, the effect is larger when banks’ default risk is higher (i.e. the
final rating is within non-investment grades) or the bank is larger (Too Big
to Fail implicit subsidy). Nevertheless, in distressed economies the effect
on larger banks is lower than average,consistent with the idea that some of
these banks might have become Too Big to Save. This interpretation of the
result is confirmed by the usual cross section analysis. Then, results suggest
the existence of a significant transfer of risk stemming from governments’
guarantees.
In the last chapter “Risk-taking and optimal joint liquidity and capital
requirements” (coauthored with Demian Macedo and Sergio Vicente) I study
the interaction between liquidity and capital requirements. For this purpose
I develop a theoretical framework in which liquidity has a dual on bank’s
risk-taking decision. On the one hand, cash reduces the likelihood of failing
due to high levels of deposit withdrawals. On the other hand, it reduces the
amount invested in loans (profitable asset). This last effect reduces banks’
charter value, leading to an increase of bank’s endogenous credit risk. In
this setting, capital reduces solvency risk (“skin in the game”), but it is
a costly tool (i.e. capital is more expensive than deposits). A regulator
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will set both liquidity and capital requirements to maximize social welfare.
In this context the model provides a relationship for the optimal capital
and liquidity requirements. If capital is relatively cheap, the regulator will
have incentives to increase its use, and liquidity will be costlier (in terms of
forgone loan investments). Hence, the regulator would need to reduce the
level of capital to compensate for the higher liquidity (substitution effect).
The opposite occurs when capital is cheaper, i.e. capital and liquidity would
be complementaries.
Overall, the three papers in this Dissertation provide evidence on the
existence of implicit guarantees during the last financial crisis, a risk transfer
from banks to governments, and the interaction between regulatory capital
and liquidity standards.
The Thesis has the following structure: the first chapter presents the
paper “Government Finances, Banks Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence
from European Stock Markets”; the second chapter consists of the paper
“Risk transfer and implicit insurance: The effect of banks’ downgrades on
sovereign debt”; chapter three is the paper entitled “Risk-taking and optimal
joint liquidity and capital requirements”; and the last chapter presents the
main bibliography used in my Dissertation.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the advice, guidance and support of
Margarita Samart´ın and Gerald Dwyer, my supervisors and co-authors. I am
also grateful to Demian Macedo and Sergio Vicente my co-authors in the last
chapter of my Thesis. I would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments
and suggestions from David Martinez-Miera and Carlos Bellon. This Thesis
received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Cul-
ture projects ECO-2010-17158 and ECO2013-42849-P, as well as from the
International Mobility Program (UC3M). All remaining errors are mine.
9
Chapter 1
Government Finances, Banks
Bailouts and Moral Hazard:
Evidence from European Stock
Markets
1.1 Introduction
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 has highlighted the relationship between
banks’ finances and government finances. Difficulties at banks created sub-
stantial financial difficulties for governments. Concerns that governments
might not have access to sufficient funds to bail out very large banks may
have created other problems. The term “Too Big to Save” (TBTS) banks
refers to banks that are so large that the government cannot manage a bailout
of them. The extreme case of such banks is Iceland, which had very large
losses and banks’ deposits that were ten times Iceland’s GDP (Flannery
2009).
Until recently, the relationship between government finances and bank
bailouts has been largely ignored, most plausibly because it was not par-
ticularly important. Banks in the Eurozone have expanded, though, with
insurance provided by the country in which banks’ headquarters are located.
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As a result, the relationship between banks’ sizes and the sizes of the home
country has been attenuated if not severed. The possibility of a mis-match
between the insured deposits and other liabilities in banks headquartered
in a country and the government’s access to funds at that scale is a real
possibility.
As a consequence, a substantial recent literature has highlighted the rela-
tionship between governments’ spending, taxes and debt and their ability to
bail out banks (Rime, 2005; Allen et al., 2011a; Bertay et al., 2013; Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2013; Zaghini, 2014). The Financial Crisis of 2007-2008
and the ensuing recession weakened governments’ finances, reducing funds
that might be used to bail out banks. When a government’s financial po-
sition is impaired, the probability of banks being bailed out falls. Partly
because of banks’s scale, as in Iceland, and partly because of governments’
financial difficulities for other reasons, larger banks might become Too Big
to Save (TBTS). If larger banks are less likely to be bailed out, then adverse
developments in governments’ finances are likely to have less effect on those
banks’ stock returns.
Analyzing the relationship between governments’ finances and banks’
market value is an important issue in the aftermath of the financial crisis,
particularly for distressed economies. The implications for regulatory poli-
cies, financial stability and the consequences for taxpayers due to bailouts in
distressed economies make the subject an important problem.
The purpose of the paper is to analyze the effect on banks’ stock returns
of announcements concerning governments’ fiscal affairs which are likely to
have an effect on governments’ willingness and ability to bail out banks. We
analyze stock returns for all listed banks headquartered in countries perceived
as having financial difficulties – Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal
11
– during the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe after the Financial Crisis of
2007-2008.
In general, we find that banks’ returns decrease when announcements in-
dicate that the governments’ financial position is impaired. This is consistent
with Acharya et al. (2014) findings: there is a significant financial relation
between banks and governments that arises mainly due to explicit and im-
plicit government guarantees. Our results indicate that investors were indeed
concerned about the governments’ ability to bail banks out. In general, the
effect of these announcements does not significantly differ between large and
small banks. Most of the evidence suggests that the market perceives all
banks as Too Big to Fail (TBTF) and markets still expect bailouts as sug-
gested by Dieckmann and Plank (2012). Some evidence is consistent with the
proposition that large banks are Too Big to Save (TBTS) Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Huizinga (2013).1
We think our analysis has several advantages compared to the prior lit-
erature. Our sample of European banks includes systemic banks as defined
by Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013 and Bertay et al., 2013) while main-
taining reasonable comparability across countries. We think that the time
period and countries used have a reasonable likelihood of TBTS banks. Us-
ing an event study to examine the relationship reduces concerns regarding
endogeneity. The underlying events are news about governments’ finances
reflecting serious difficulties with the governments’ overall budget.2 Finally,
an event study provides a neat interpretation in terms of abnormal excess
returns caused by the events.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents a
1This does not imply that banks in some other time or place cannot be too big to save.
The banks in Iceland were too big for Iceland’s taxpayers to pay off the depositors.
2It is not possible to be certain that endogeneity is not a problem (Roberts and Whited,
2012).
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literature review. Section 1.3 shows the empirical approach, data sources
and develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 presents the results and
different layers of analysis and section 5 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
Our paper contributes to the literature on the too big to fail and too big
to save problems, as well as to the literature on sovereigns and the financial
sector. In the next pages, we summarize both strands of literature.
1.2.1 Market discipline, too big too fail and Too big to
save
“Market discipline” is a term used to summarize the relationship between the
riskiness of banks’ activities and the responses by holders of the banks’ lia-
bilities. Riskier banks have a higher probability of defaulting on the holders
of their liabilities and a higher expected return compensates holders of liabil-
ities for this risk. As emphasized in the literature, this relationship limits the
riskiness of banks’ activities. In addition, market discipline is exercised by
depositors when they withdraw funds due to perceived risk (Calomiris and
Kahn, 1991).3
Therefore, potential losses borne by holders of banks’ liabilities are the
basis of market discipline. However, when bailouts are expected, market
3There are different ways to proxy for market discipline. For instance Gorton and San-
tomero (1990) and Flannery and Sorescu (1996) use the implied volatilities of subordinated
debt, while Morgan and Stiroh (2001) use bond spreads as measures for market discipline.
Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) follow a different approach: they use deposit inter-
est rates and deposits withdrawal rate to study market discipline. All these measures are
ex-post. Others including Nier and Baumann (2006) and Bushman and Williams (2012)
use ex-ante market discipline measures such as the level of capital buffers, the sensitivity
of leverage to risk or even accounting disclosures.
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discipline decreases or even vanishes. In particular, when deposit insurance
schemes are set up or there is any type of implicit insurance, depositors no
longer require a risk premium in exchange for risk nor run on banks, as the
risk is transferred to the insurer (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Baier
et al., 2012).
Because of this change in relative prices, banks will increase risk taking,
and will have incentives to become big to fail (TBTF). O’Hara and Shaw
(1990) test this hypothesis using an event study and find that shareholders
from TBTF banks received a positive wealth effect when the Comptroller
of the Currency announced that a set of large banks would not be allowed
to fail. This effect is a clear example on how bailout expectations affect
banks’ shareholders. Similarly, Penas and Unal (2004) find evidence con-
sistent with the TBTF hypothesis analyzing the reaction of bond prices to
M&A announcements.
For large enough banks though, governments might find challenges and
even face bankruptcy when providing guarantees to the financial system
(Allen et al., 2011a). Countries’ public finances may restrain the possible
solutions to banks’ distress. It may be infeasible to provide funds to keep
banks operating, at least for banks that are too big to save (TBTS). Countries
belonging to a monetary union may be in an even worse situation since they
cannot monetize these guarantees. If a government can issue debt only in for-
eign currency or otherwise inflation protected, the same situation arises. In
Iceland, virtually all government debt was denominated in foreign currency
or inflation protected.
Analyzing banks’ ratings, Rime (2005) failed to find evidence consistent
with the perception that larger banks are TBTS. Analyzing equity prices and
CDS spreads, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) find evidence suggesting
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that systemically larger banks (as measured by their liabilities to GDP ratio)
have become TBTS. This situation is particularly worse in countries with
large fiscal deficits and high levels of sovereign debt. Similarly Bertay et al.
(2013) find that systemically larger banks present lower returns on assets and
equity with no risk reduction, while their funding costs are more sensitive
to risk measures (z-score). These results are consistent with the existence of
banks that are TBTS.
1.2.2 Sovereigns and the financial sector
Dieckmann and Plank (2012) analyze sovereign CDS and find a significant
risk transmission from banks to the public sector. This result is consistent
with expectations of bailouts of banks by governments.
Acharya and Rajan (2013) develop a model to explain how myopic gov-
ernments increase sovereign debt holdings by their own banks, increasing
financial instability. Acharya and Steffen (2015) find evidence consistent
with a carry-trade behavior when analyzing the risk flow from sovereigns to
banks.
From a theoretical perspective, Acharya et al. (2014) and Leonello (2015)
analyze the relationship between sovereign risk and bank risk. This link
between banks and governments generates a feedback effect that arises due to
bailout expectations and guarantees to the financial system. This framework
is empirically confirmed when analyzing the relationship between bank and
sovereigns CDS spreads (Acharya et al., 2014). This is a clear illustration on
how bailout expectations have an effect on governments’ perceived finances.
Finally, using bank data collected from the ECB stress-test, Beltratti and
Stulz (2015) conduct an event study using the CDS price on government debt
and find that the stock prices for all the banks in a country to be negatively
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affected by a large increase in the price of the country’s CDS, and that the
stock price of banks with a larger exposure to its country’s debt are more
negatively affected by a shock to the country’s finances. Additionally, they
find the largest sovereign exposure are by banks from peripheral countries to
their own country’s debt.
In this paper, we examine the existence of a link between sovereign gov-
ernments’ finances and banks’ risk due to government guarantees.
1.3 Hypotheses and Estimation Strategy
Our general assumption is that that a deterioration of a governments’ fiscal
position leads to a higher sensitivity of shareholders to banks’ risk taking.
This suggests that a negative announcement concerning a government’s bud-
get will generate a negative abnormal return for banks insured explicitly
and implicitly by that government. Similarly, a positive development will
generate a positive abnormal return.
Note that the problem that all of the country’s faced was that their debts
and those of their banks were denominated in a currency over which their
government had no control: the euro. If the debt had been denominated
in a currency over which the government had control, it could have paid its
own debt and credibly guaranteed the nominal value of its banks’ debt. Of
course, that may have had some significant inflationary consequences.4
To focus on this issue, we study Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal
during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis after the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2008. When we use dates of the sovereign-debt crisis, we define that period
as extending from October 1, 2009 to the end of our data in December 2012
4We thank one of the reviewers for pointing this out. This fact is also mentioned in
(Allen et al., 2011a).
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(Lane, 2012).
1.3.1 Hypotheses
The general assumption of a relationship between government finances and
banks’ stock returns is reflected in the following hypothesis:
H1: Events affecting governments’ fiscal positions are positively correlated
with banks’ abnormal stock returns.
No such relationship could mean one of several things. It could be that banks
(as a portfolio) never had implicit insurance, the event was too small to affect
bailout expectations, or the event was fully anticipated.
We also are interested in the differential reaction between larger and
smaller banks.
H2: Events affecting governments’ fiscal position have a larger effect on
larger banks’ stock returns, if larger banks are regarded as too big to save.
This hypothesis is consistent with the TBTS proposition put forth by Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt and Huizinga (2013), Bertay et al. (2013) and Allen et al. (2011a).
When a governments’ fiscal situation deteriorates, it is more likely that the
government will not bail out larger financial institutions. Stockholders are
less likely to be bailed out and are more exposed to banks’ risk, which gener-
ates a negative abnormal stock return. If the opposite relationship holds with
larger banks’ returns less affected than smaller banks’ returns, such results
are more consistent with larger banks being regarded as too big to fail with
stockholders in smaller banks not being bailed out.
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1.3.2 Events
Events are selected considering two elements: their association with gov-
ernments’ ability to bail out banks; and the extent to which the events are
unexpected. The latter is a major issue since expectations play a key role
in our analysis. If an event is predicted perfectly, then abnormal returns are
unaffected. It is not an easy task to determine the extent to which an an-
nouncement is actually unexpected. We try to tackle this issue using several
strategies. First, we focus on a crisis time period. During calmer periods,
policy announcements may be be more accurately anticipated than in a cri-
sis one (Ait-Sahalia et al., 2012). Second, many of our events are watershed
policy events as presented by media (similar to Ait-Sahalia et al., 2012).
We analyze a set of events that can be classified into five broad categories.
In all, we have 57 events. Table 1.2 presents the number of the various types
of events for each country.
• Financial aid request : governments formally request financial help from
the ECB. We obtain the dates of such announcements from the ECB.5
The effect of these particular announcements might go in either direc-
tion. On the one hand it is a clear signal that the financial health of the
sovereign country is jeopardized, for which we would expect a negative
reaction on the market. On the other hand, the announcement might
be interpreted as a possible inflow of fresh funds to the governments.
• Financial aid approved : the IMF, the ECB and the European Com-
5Data were gathered from the ECB’s “Key dates of the financial cri-
sis” timeline (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/html/crisis.en.html).
Additionally, we use Bloomberg’s “Greek Crisis Timeline” to double
check the announcements (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-05/
greek-crisis-timeline-from-maastricht-treaty-to-ecb-bond-buying.html).
We add the date in which the 2nd bailout to Greece was agreed by the Euro-area finance
ministers.
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mission agree on financial aid packages to troubled economies. These
dates also are from the ECB. We expect that these announcements
have a positive effect on banks’ returns. Among this type of events,
we include the second bailout agreement for Greece in which the “vol-
untary contribution of the private sector” implied in the end a 53.5%
write-down for private Greek bond holders in the ’selective default’.
• Sovereign downgrades : announcements of downgrades of sovereign bonds
by Moody’s. The dates of these announcements are from Moody’s web
page for the ‘2007-2012’ period. A downgrade on sovereign debt sug-
gests a higher cost of debt for the government and a lower ability to
issue new ‘affordable’ debt, which impairs its bailout capacity. It might
seem that a decrease in the sovereign debt’s rating implies a subsequent
downgrade in the banks’ rating. This is not the case because the upper
bound for a firms’ rating is the corresponding ‘country ceiling’ and not
sovereign debt ratings.6
• Forecasts revisions : press releases in which debt forecasts (for previ-
ous or future periods) are revised upwards by any relevant institutions.
These institutions are national governments, central banks, and Eu-
ropean organizations such as Eurostat. Clearly, these announcements
have a negative effect on governments’ perceived fiscal position and ul-
timately on bailout capacity. These announcements and the dates are
gathered from major press media (New York Times, Wall Street Jour-
nal, Financial Times, Bloomberg and Reuters). We use well known
international mainstream financial media to avoid selection of irrele-
6For our 25 downgrades there are only 2 cases in which there was also a downgrade of
the country ceiling (Italian and Spanish downgrades during 2012). Results are robust if
these two cases are excluded.
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vant information for the markets. To gather these announcements we
mainly used the LexisNexis database.7 We only consider those cases
in which there is an explicit recognition of the change in the forecast
or the estimation of deficit or debt. Even though we standardize the
search process and try to make it as comprehensive as possible, there
is some arbitrariness involved. Even so, it is replicable.
• Suspension of eligibility : the governing council of the ECB suspends
the acceptability of marketable debt instruments issued or guaranteed
by a government as collateral. The dates of these announcements are
obtained from the ECB’s web page. These events are expected to have
a negative effect on governments’ finances because their bonds and
bonds guaranteed by them are likely to be viewed as riskier.
1.3.3 Methodology
We use event studies to analyze the reaction of banks’ stock returns to a set
of announcements regarding governments’ finances. Event studies are a way
to evaluate whether news about some specific event affects stock returns.
The classical approach by Kothari and Warner (2007) uses residuals from an
estimated market model around the date of the event and t-tests.8
An alternative procedure is to analyze abnormal returns using estimated
regressions. Ongena et al. (2003) use this approach to evaluate the impact
of announcements concerning troubled banks on the stock returns of related
firms. Afonso et al. (2012) use it to analyze the effect of rating downgrades
on sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads. This approach uses dummy
7The data appendix provides a description of the exact parameters used for this search.
8Kothari and Warner (2007) argue that when using short-term horizon events, the test
statistic is not very sensitive to the model used to estimate normal returns.
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variables on the days of the events and surrounding dates in a market model
regression:9
Ri,t = αi + βiR
local
m,t + ηiR
global
m,t +
+τ∑
k=−τ
γi,kδi,k,t + i,t (1.1)
where Ri,t is the return of bank i in period t, R
local
m,t is the market return for a
particular country (e.g. IBEX) in period t. In order to account for a common
factor that affects all banks across countries, we introduce the return on a
Eurozone market index, Rglobalm,t (Euro Stoxx 50). Finally δi,k,t is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if bank i has an event in period t for the
event window k. This setting is used for each type of event.10 Then, the
cumulative abnormal return for a particular event window and event-type is
given by the sum of the corresponding dummy variables. For instance, for
the three day CAR[-1,+1] for firm i we would compute:
CARi (−1,+1) = γˆi,−1 + γˆi,0 + γˆi,+1 (1.2)
We do not have enough observations between events to construct a market
model for each event and the regression obviates making arbitrary choices
of dates and overlap for events. We analyze the relationship between banks’
stock returns and governments’ finances in several different ways.
First, we analyze the effects of the selected events on banks’ stock returns.
9Given the nature of our experiment and the timing of the events (and the reactions
we measure), we would expect that reverse causality is not a severe issue in this study, In
general, the events we have selected involve a certain time before any announcement can be
made. Hence, any variation in banks’ stock returns around the day of the announcement
is not likely to influence or trigger the event itself. For example, the fact that Moody’s
announced a downgrade on sovereign debt for a particular country is not related to the
volatility of banks’ stock returns surrounding the day of the announcement. If any, this
feature would strengthen our results. As there might be a partial anticipation to our
events, the reaction we are able to measure represents only a proportion of the overall
reaction associated with the event.
10We use clustered standard errors in our regression analysis.
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This provides evidence on the general market reaction to these events and
the expected direction of the effects on the returns as in equation (1.1). We
then add interactions terms between the dummy variables for events and a
systemic-size dummy variable to equation (1.1) and estimate:
Ri,t = αi + βiR
local
m,t + ηiR
global
m,t +
+τ∑
k=−τ
γi,kδi,k,t +
+τ∑
k=−τ
φi,k(δi,k,t × Sizei,t) + i,t
(1.3)
We use several alternative systemic-size dummy variables. These dummy
variables take the value one if the systemic size of the bank is above a cer-
tain threshold and zero otherwise. Following Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga
(2013), we use four different thresholds, 10%, 25%, 50% and 100%. A 10 per
cent threshold would mean that those banks that have a ratio of Liabilities
to GDP above 10 per cent would qualify as systematic. The same definition
applies for the rest of the thresholds. This analysis allows to look for larger
or smaller effects on systemically larger banks.
As a second approach, we aggregate banks’ returns into portfolios at the
country level. This reduces the effect of individual banks’ idiosnyncratic risk
and emphasizes common factors affecting all banks in a country. We build
two portfolios by country: one for large banks and one for smaller banks. We
repeat this procedure using different size thresholds to determine the banks
in each portfolio. We follow Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) in their
definition of systemic size for the different thresholds used. These data then
are used to estimate whether there is a differential effect on returns between
the portfolios and evaluate its significance in the regression:
(RLargei,t −RSmalli,t ) = αi + βiRlocalm,t + ηiRglobalm,t +
+τ∑
k=−τ
γi,kδi,k,t + i,t (1.4)
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As a check on the sensitivity of the results to other variables, we repeat
the original regression (1.1) with control variables added for banks’ charac-
teristics in addition to fixed effects for each bank to check whether these
variables affect the results. Among these variables we include the ratio be-
tween bank’s net sovereign debt holdings from their home country (home
bias) and their total assets. This information was collected from the EBA
stress tests.11
Because the sovereign-debt crisis itself may have affected responses to gov-
ernments’ financial difficulties, we also differentiate events occurring during
the sovereign debt crisis. Given that we want to test if financially distressed
governments are more or less likely to bail out banks, we test whether this
effect was different during the sovereign crisis. We introduce time specific
dummy variables and interactions in the basic regression analysis (1.1) and
estimate:
Ri,t = αi+βiR
local
m,t +ηiR
global
m,t +
+τ∑
k=−τ
γi,kδi,k,t+φSov.t+
+τ∑
k=−τ
ξi,k(δi,k,t×Sovt)+i,t
(1.5)
The variable Sovt is a dummy variable which equals one during the sovereign
debt crisis and zero otherwise. For our purposes, the sovereign-debt crisis
starts in October 2009 and continues until the end of our data in December
2012 (Lane, 2012).
To further check our results, we examine whether the banks’ abnormal
returns are related to the banks’ characteristics and variables related to
11One caveat is that our accounting information is annual but market returns reflect
information daily. Additionally, the EBA stress tests did not cover all the banks/years we
analyze. For those years and banks for which we do not have information on sovereign
debt holdings, we set de value at zero. As robustness, we use the average or the last
available information, and results are not qualitatively different.
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bailouts. Using the regression analysis, we estimate an abnormal return
for each individual event based on a unique dummy variable for each event.12
These individual abnormal returns are the estimated γ coefficients from equa-
tion (1.1) for each individual event. In this case, the estimation is using
country and day fixed effects. Then we perform a cross-section analysis in
which these abnormal returns are regressed on a set of bank level character-
istics including banks’ sizes, systemic sizes as well as their home countries’
government debt ratio. Additionally we include bank’s sovereign exposure
to their home country. This is in order to control for the alternative expla-
nation of the bank-sovereign vicious circle, i.e. it is banks’ sovereign debt
holdings that explains most of the relationship (rather than the probability
of bailout). Finally, we control for a set of bank level characteristics.13 This
regression is repeated for each event type:
ARi,t = αi+Sizei,t+Sys.Sizei,t+Gov.Debti,t+NetSov.Debti,t+Controlsi,t+i,t
(1.6)
These controls are the Liquidity Ratio, the Equity Ratio, ROA and z-
score. The Liquidity Ratio is the ratio of banks’ cash holdings to total assets.
The Equity Ratio is the ratio between banks’ equity and total assets. The
z-score is estimated using the equity’s volatility for all the period.
Table 1.1 presents the number of banks for each country that meet dif-
ferent size thresholds – 10% , 25% or 50% as previous literature suggests –
which are intended to represent possibly systemically important sizes.
12These dummy variables are constructed at the individual-event level, while the original
analysis used dummy variables at the event-type level.
13One potential concern in this analysis, stems from the lack of dispersion in the controls
for some types of events which occur seldom and then in the same year.
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1.3.4 Data
We analyze stock returns for a set of publicly listed European banks after
the financial crisis during the Fall 2008. There are two main reasons for the
time period selected. During a crisis, policy announcements and other re-
lated events are less anticipated than during normal times (Ait-Sahalia et al.,
2012). Additionally, many European countries were highly indebted with in-
creasing borrowing costs, which limited their ability to bail out banks. We
include banks headquartered in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal.
Figure 1.1 shows government debt and deficits relative to GDP for these
countries.
Data for stock returns are obtained from DataStream. We include every
firm which is classified as a bank by Thomson Reuters.14 We complete this
list using Bankscope because DataStream classifies some banks as financial
sector firms. Adding Bankscope’s banks ensures a more complete set of banks
in these countries. Finally, we obtain data on bank’s individual sovereign
debt holdings from the EU-wide stress test. This information is available
on EBA’s web page. We keep only stocks for which we have a measure of
‘adjusted prices’, which correspond to the primary quote of the firm. We
consider only those banks for which the stock was actively traded during the
period of interest (around each event). We have 56 banks with data available
from January 2007 to December 2012.15 Table 1.1 shows the distribution of
banks among countries. Bank-level accounting information is obtained from
Bankscope. Data for the market indexes (both the ‘specific country’ and
14DataStream classifies companies as banks based upon the main activity of the com-
pany.
15By the end of 2012, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) entered into force with
the objective to provide for a permanent rescue funding programme for Member States.
In this case governments’ bailout capacity would be better guaranteed. This would reduce
the bank-sovereign nexus and the interest of our analysis.
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the Eurozone index) are obtained from DataStream. These are the usual
benchmarks used at the country and Euro-area level.
1.4 Empirical results
1.4.1 The effect of events on banks’ stock returns
We regress the returns for each individual bank on the corresponding mar-
ket return in the country, the Eurozone market return and a set of dummy
variables that take the value one if there was an event of the corresponding
type that day and zero otherwise. Additionally, we include dummy variables
that take the value of one on the day before and the day after the event to
estimate the CAR from t− k to t + k where k varies from one to five. This
procedure is repeated for each event type. All regressions are estimated using
bank and year fixed effects (see equation 1.1).
The results for the regression analysis are presented in table 1.3 using a
3-day event window.16 The cumulative effects are presented in Table 1.4 with
the corresponding tests of joint significance for the abnormal returns using
3,5,7 and 11-days windows for each type of event.
We start analyzing the 3-day window (column (1) from Table 1.4). The
coefficient for Financial Aid Approved is positive and statistically significant.
This is consistent with the existence of a general explicit or implicit insurance
and a resulting positive relationship between improving government finances
and banks’ stock returns. The dummy variable Financial Aid Request has a
negative and statistically significant coefficient. This explicit recognition of
16We consider this is a sufficiently narrow window and it would not be contaminated.
Additionally, it allows to capture some anticipated effect of the announcements, and ac-
count for any lagged reaction on the market (particularly important for those cases in
which the announcement was made outside trading hours).
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government’s financial difficulties is associated with lower stock returns for
banks, consistent with banks’ reliance on government’s guarantees. Similarly,
the dummy variable for Sovereign Downgrades has a negative and highly sig-
nificant coefficient. A lower credit rating implies a higher cost of issuing
government debt and a higher cost of raising funds to bail out financial in-
stitutions. The dummy variable Suspension of Eligibility also has a negative
and significant coefficient, which is consistent with the rationale for the other
coefficients.
These results are consistent with the existence of a general explicit and
implicit insurance to banks which is perceived to be impaired when govern-
ments finances deteriorate.
Table 1.4 columns (2) to (4) presents the results for additional event
windows. Expanding the event window to 5-days (-1,+3), does not alter
substantially our previous conclusions. All coefficients have the same signs.
The effect of Financial Aid Approved and Financial Aid Request increases
in magnitude and significance level. The Sovereign Downgrade has a larger
coefficient which remains statistically significant. The dummy variable Sus-
pension of Eligibility losses all of its explanatory power when expanding the
event window. These results are consistent with the fact that stock returns
take a few days to fully reflect announcements. The estimates for the 7-day
window (-3,+3) lead to similar inferences. Extending the analysis to an 11-
day event window (-5,+5) reduces the stastical significance level, which can
be interpreted as indicating the window is longer than necessary to reflect
effects on returns.17
These results are consistent with a statistically and economically signif-
icant reaction of bank’ stock returns to announcements concerning govern-
17There is an exception: the coefficient for the dummy variable Forecast Revision be-
comes highly significant and negative.
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ments’ fiscal soundness. For relatively wider event windows, the reaction
seems to become less important for most types of events with the exception
of Forecast Revisions.
As mentioned above, part of the effect might be increased due to the
sovereign debt crisis. We test this suggestion by estimating equation (1.5).
Results for the 3-day window are presented in Table 1.5. 18 Because all of the
events for Financial Aid Approved, Financial Aid Request and Suspension of
Eligibility occur during the sovereign crisis, we omit interaction coefficients
for these events. The most important change is for Sovereign Downgrades.
The overall reaction to these events is significantly larger than before (still
negative and highly significant at 1% level). Somewhat surprisingly, the ad-
ditional effect of these downgrades during the sovereign debt crisis is positive
and statistically significant. Nevertheless the magnitude is relatively small,
and the total effect for this type of events remains negative and statistically
significant. (This test is not reported).
Finally, we include a set of additional controls in our basic regression.
These are bank level characteristics collected from their accounting state-
ments, and sovereign exposure to their home country from the EU-wide stress
tests. Table 1.6 presents the regression using a 3-day window, and Table 1.7
presents the corresponding CAR (and significance level) for 3, 5 and 7-days
windows.
The results are consistent with the baseline analysis in terms of the mag-
nitude and direction of the coefficients as well as their significance level. An
interesting difference is the coefficient for Forecast Revision which becomes
significant and negative for narrower event windows. As we increase the
width of the event windows, these coefficient tend to become less significant
18Using different event windows does not qualitatively affect these results, and therefore
we do not report these tables.
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but this reduction is lower than in the baseline scenario.
All these results indicate the existence of a significant reaction of banks’
stock returns to announcements regarding government’s financial health. The
evidence is consistent with the proposition that banks are perceived as hav-
ing a partial guarantee by the government and developments affecting gov-
ernments’ finances affects banks’ stock returns. We now test whether this
reaction is related to banks’ size, whether it only that some banks are too
big to save and to what extent banks can be too big to save.
1.4.2 Banks’ sizes, too big to fail and too big to save
Baseline approach
In this section we analyze whether there is a differential reaction to the
same set of events depending on banks’ size and try to assess whether larger
banks may be too big to fail or too big to save. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga
(2013)’s results suggest that the relationship between banks’ returns and size
may not be linear. In order to test whether larger banks have a differential
reaction to news, we use interactions between dummy variables for events
and a systemic-size dummy as in equation (1.3). These interactions show
the additional effect of size. Under the TBTF and TBTS hypotheses, these
interactions are important. If large banks are too big to fail, the interaction
effect will not be important. If banks are too big to save, an announcement
concerning government finances will have a larger effect on larger banks.
Table 1.8 presents the results using the four different size thresholds.
For simplicity we only tabulate the 3-day window (-1,+1). Consistent with
our previous results, for the 10% threshold (column (1)) most of the event
dummy variables remain highly significant (except for the Forecast Revision
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and the Financial Aid Approved events). Nevertheless only the Forecast
Revision interaction is negative and statistically significant (at a 5% level).
This interaction suggests that upward revisions in governments’ debt ratios
affect larger banks relatively more than smaller banks. This is consistent
with the TBTS hypothesis. Analyzing the 25% threshold (column (2)) does
not substantially affect the previous results: most of the dummy variables
are significant (including Forecast Revision now), but only the interaction be-
tween Systemic Size and Forecast Revision is significant (with a marginally
lower significance level). Again, these results provide some limited evidence
consistent with the existence of TBTS banks. Column (3) presents the re-
sults for the 50% size threshold. The event dummy variables remain mostly
unchanged, but there are some significant changes in the interaction terms.
In this case the additional effect of Forecast Revision on large banks disap-
pears, while the interaction coefficient for the Suspension of Eligibility be-
comes significant and positive. Both effects are inconsistent with the TBTS
hypothesis. The effect of Forecast Revision on larger banks is not signifi-
cantly different than the average, while the negative effect of Suspension of
Eligibility events on larger banks is significantly smaller than the average. Fi-
nally column (4) presents the results for the 100% size threshold. In this case
all the event dummy variables are statistically significant. With respect to
the size-interactions, the coefficient for the Forecast Revision events becomes
statistically significant but positive. This means that larger banks are signif-
icantly less negatively affected by these announcements than average. This
evidence is consistent with the idea that these larger banks are still implicitly
insured (not TBTS). The size interaction for the Suspension of Eligibility co-
efficient is not included since all banks affected by these announcements are
smaller than 100%.
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As a complementary test, Table 1.9 presents the results for the analysis in
equation (1.3) with bank-level controls for accounting variables. As before,
columns (1) to (4) present the information for different size thresholds. The
main conclusions of this test are not different from the previous analysis.
The effect of the announcements on larger banks is not more important than
average. In fact, in some cases the effect on larger banks is significantly
smaller than the average.
Taken altogether, this evidence casts reasonable doubt about the propo-
sition that larger banks are too big to save in this episode. It seems that
larger banks are not significantly more affected than smaller banks (or even
less negatively affected), suggesting that they are still protected.19
Portfolio approach
As an alternative approach to assess the relationship between banks’ stock
return and governments’ finances, we build two different portfolios at the
country level based on banks’ systemic size. We use four different thresh-
olds to differentiate small from large banks. Following Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Huizinga 2013, we sequentially use the 10%, 25%, 50% and 100% thresh-
olds. We then compute the mean return for each portfolio and calculate
the difference in returns between large and small banks. We examine this
difference in returns in a regression analysis with the market return and the
event dummy variables. We use country and year fixed effects. If there are
differential effects on large and small banks, the coefficients of these dummy
variables should be significant with the sign depending on whether larger
19Edward Kane suggested an alternative interpretation of these results. It might be
possible that the U.S. Federal Reserve is acting as a de facto global lender of last resort.
If this is correct, then it does not matter whether European governments cannot bail out
banks because the Federal Reserve would do so.
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banks are too big to fail or too big to save.
Table 1.10 presents the analysis using a 3-day event window. Columns (1)
to (4) show the results using the 10% up to the 100% thresholds to create the
portfolios corresponding to large and small banks. None of the coefficients
is statistically significant, with the exception of Suspension of Eligibility.
Larger banks’ average reaction is not different from smaller banks. For the
case of Suspension of Eligibility, the smaller reaction of smaller banks with
respect to larger banks is consistent with too big to fail.
Table 1.11 presents the same analysis extending the event window to 5
days (-1,+3). As in the previous case, columns (1) to (4) show the analysis
through different size-thresholds. The results for the 10% size threshold con-
firm our previous conclusions: larger banks are not significantly more affected
than smaller banks. Furthermore, the coefficients for Sovereign Downgrade
and Suspension of Eligibility show that smaller banks reacted significantly
more than larger banks. This evidence provides some support that larger
banks are more likely to be bailed out, as suggested by TBTF. The same
results and conclusions hold for the 25% size threshold analysis. For the
50% threshold, the coefficient of Financial Aid Approved event is positive
and significant and consistent with the TBTS hypothesis. Nevertheless, the
coefficient for the Financial Aid Approved (positive and significant) conflicts.
Similarly, the coefficient for Suspension of Eligibility does not support the
TBTS hypothesis. Finally, the 100% threshold leads to a similar conclusion.
Both the coefficients for Forecast Revision and Suspension of Eligibility are
positive and significant, i.e. smaller banks reacted more to these set of events.
Table 1.12 presents the same sort of analysis using a 7-day window (-
3,+3). Using a 10% size threshold most of the coefficients are not significant,
i.e. the difference in mean returns between large and small banks is not
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statistically different. Nevertheless, it is not the case for Suspension of Eligi-
bility, that has a negative and significant coefficient. This means that larger
banks are more affected than smaller banks (considering a wider event win-
dow), consistent with the idea that these banks might be considered TBTS.
Similar results hold for the 25% threshold. However, as we increase the size
threshold this effect disappears. The coefficient for Suspension of Eligibil-
ity events, when using the 50% threshold, becomes negative. Smaller banks
reacted more than larger ones, which is against the TBTS hypothesis. Fi-
nally, analyzing the 100% size threshold only the coefficient for Financial Aid
Approved events is consistent with the TBTS rationale. The coefficients for
Forecast Revision and Suspension of Eligibility are positive and significant,
which is incompatible with the TBTS explanation.
As in the baseline analysis, there is some evidence consistent with TBTF
and bits of evidence consistent with TBTS. Overall, we interpret the evidence
as more consistent with an hypothesis that No Bank is Too Small to Save.
Cross section analysis approach
We also carry out a cross-section analysis of the results assuming a linear
relationship between abnormal returns and size, systemic size and the ratio
of government debt to GDP. We estimate banks’ abnormal returns for each
individual event. We use the basic equation (1.1) with country and day
fixed effects to estimate the corresponding 3-day reaction for each individual
event, i.e. the γ coefficient for each individual event. Then we regress these
abnormal returns on banks’ size, systemic size, the ratio of government debt
to GDP, the ratio of sovereign debt holdings and the set of bank level controls
(equation 1.6).
Table 1.13 presents the cross-section analysis for the Financial Aid Ap-
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proved events. For most of the specifications, the government-debt to GDP
ratio has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. The positive ef-
fect of these announcements on banks is lower when government’s debt is
higher. This evidence can be interpreted as consistent with more distressed
governments being less likely to bail out banks. This lower likelihood de-
creases the reaction of banks’ stock returns to a favorable event. None of
the systemic size dummy variables has a statistically significant coefficient.
There is one specification in which size has a positive and significant coeffi-
cient, which means that larger banks reacted more importantly to this sort
of announcements. But this concerns one of out five results and it is hardly
overwhelming.
Table 1.14 shows the analysis for Financial Aid Requests. The effect
of government-debt to GDP is positive and significant across all specifica-
tions. This means that the negative effect on banks’ returns of this type
of announcements (recall the results from Table 1.4) is mitigated when gov-
ernments are highly indebted. Even though these announcements implicitly
recognize government’s poor financial situation, this can be interpreted as
indicating a possible later inflow of funds. None of the regressions suggests
differential effects across large and small banks.
The results for Forecast Revisions are presented in Table 1.15. There
is only one statistically significant coefficient at the ten percent significance
level for size, out of five estimated coefficients. There is one coefficient of
systemic size statistically significant at the five percent level and another at
the ten percent level. None of the coefficients of the ratio of government debt
to GDP is statistically significant. Overall, this evidence suggests that banks’
abnormal returns associated with Forecast Revisions are hardly affected by
government debt and systemic size considerations.
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Finally, Table 1.16 shows the results for Sovereign Downgrades. The
coefficient of the ratio of government debt to GDP is consistently negative and
statistically significant at the ten percent level across specifications. Banks
located in more indebted economies are more negatively affected by these
announcements. Additionally in two specifications the coefficient for Size
is negative and significant at the ten percent and in one specification it is
significant at the five percent. This suggests that larger banks reacted more
to this sort of announcements. Systemic Size have no effect on the magnitude
of the reaction in none of the equations, with statistically insignificant and
numerically small coefficients.
The analysis for the Suspension of Eligibility events is not presented be-
cause most of the variables of interest are omitted due to perfect collinearity
given the small sample size. The variables omitted and those left in are
arbitrary and the results cannot be informative.20
1.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we use an event study, in order to see whether there is a
relationship between governments’ finances and the perceived likelihood that
banks will be bailed out. We analyze the reactions of banks’ stock returns to
a series of announcements concerning governments’ finances. The advantage
of this type of analysis lies on its simplicity and the ease of interpreting the
results while reducing endogeneity issues. These events are directly related
to government’s ability to bail out the banking system.
We find that the overall reaction of stock prices to these announcements
is significant. Banks’ return reacts negatively to adverse announcements con-
20No variable is statistically significant.
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cerning government finances. This suggests that the perceived probability of
stockholders being bailed out goes down when government finances deterio-
rate.
We find some evidence that larger banks are more affected than smaller
banks, although it is not overwhelming. This conclusion remains valid using
different approaches, i.e. the basic regression framework, regressions using
mean portfolios analysis or using the usual cross section analysis.
For the Eurozone sovereign-debt crisis, the evidence indicates that No
Bank is Too Small to be Save. We find a clear statistical association between
banks’ stock returns and announcements concerning governments’ finances.
We find bits of evidence supporting the propositions that larger banks are
Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save. The clearest evidence, though, is the
regressions of returns of large banks minus the returns of small banks, which
shows little evidence of any differential effect on large banks compared to
small banks.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Banks by Country
Market Banks
10% Systemic
Size
25% Systemic
Size
50% Systemic
Size
Greece 13 7 4 2
Ireland 4 4 4 3
Italy 21 3 2 1
Portugal 5 3 3 1
Spain 13 5 3 2
Total 56 22 16 9
Table 1.2: Event types by country
Type / Market Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Total
Financial aid - Agreement 4 1 0 1 1 7
Financial aid - Request 1 1 0 1 1 4
Forecast revision 7 1 3 4 4 19
Moody’s Downgrade 7 5 3 5 5 25
Suspension of eligibility 2 0 0 0 0 2
Total 21 8 6 11 11 57
37
Table 1.3: Regression Analysis - Bank level abnormal returns
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Local Market Index 1.2363*** 1.2353*** 1.2351*** 1.2353*** 1.2363***
Euro Market Index -0.2837*** -0.2829*** -0.2828*** -0.2828*** -0.2840***
Financial Aid Approved
t = -1 0.0062 - - - -
t = 0 0.0120** - - - -
t = +1 0.0080* - - - -
Financial Aid Request
t = -1 - 0.0007 - - -
t = 0 - -0.0115 - - -
t = +1 - -0.0173* - - -
Forecast Revision
t = -1 - - -0.002 - -
t = 0 - - -0.0024 - -
t = +1 - - -0.0038* - -
Sovereign Downgrade
t = -1 - - - 0.0011 -
t = 0 - - - -0.0042** -
t = +1 - - - -0.0069*** -
Suspension of Eligibility
t = -1 - - - - -0.0087***
t = 0 - - - - -0.0277***
t = +1 - - - - 0.0044
Constant -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004***
N 80021 80021 80021 80021 80021
Adj.R2 0.2821 0.2821 0.282 0.2821 0.2821
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
The dependent variable is a Bank’s Stock Return. Local Market Index is the return for
the corresponding country benchmark index (vary across countries). Euro Market Index
stands for the return of a common benchmark index (same for all countries). Column
(1) presents the information for Financial Aid Approved events while column (2)
presents the results for the Financial Aid Request events. Column (3) shows the results
for the Forecast Revision dummy, and column (4) for Sovereign Downgrades events.
Finally in column (5) we use the Suspension of Eligibility events. The coefficients for
t = −1 corresponds to the abnormal reaction on bank’s returns (for the corresponding
type of event) the day before the event takes place. The coefficients for t = 0 and t = +1
correspond to the reaction on the day of the event, and the day following the even
respectively. All regressions are using bank and year fixed effects.
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Table 1.4: Bank’s Abnormal Returns - 3, 5 , 7 & 11 days CAR
Type (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fin. Aid Approved 0.0262** 0.0328*** 0.0554*** 0.032**
Fin. Aid Request -0.0281** -0.0495*** -0.0347** 0.0092
Forecast Revision -0.0083 -0.0008 -0.0041 -0.0324***
Sovereign Downgrade -0.0099*** -0.0133*** -0.0112** -0.0167*
Susp. of Elig. -0.0319*** -0.011 0.0187 -0.0114
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Column (1) presents the information for the 3-day windows (-1,+1), column (2) for the
5-day windows (-1;+3), column (3) do so for the 7-day windows (-3,+3) and column (4)
for the 11-day windows (-5,+5). Results correspond to the analysis of different event
windows estimated using equations 1.1 and 1.2. All regressions are using bank and year
fixed effects.
Table 1.5: Bank’s Abnormal Returns - Sovereign Crisis Period
Type CAR[t-1; t+1] P-Value
Fin. Aid Approved 0.0262 0.0281
Fin. Aid Request -0.0281 0.0204
Forecast Revision -0.0006 0.8529
Sovereign Downgrade -0.0813 0.0002
Susp. of Elig. -0.0319 0.0000
Fin.Aid.Appr. × Sov. Crisis (omitted) (omitted)
Fin.Aid.Req. × Sov. Crisis (omitted) (omitted)
For.Rev. × Sov. Crisis 0.0024 0.3157
Sov.Downg. × Sov. Crisis 0.003 0.0011
Susp.Elig. × Sov. Crisis (omitted) (omitted)
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Interactions corresponding to rescue programs and suspension of eligibility are omitted
due to collinearity. This arises since all these events occur during the sovereign debt
crisis. All regressions are using bank and year fixed effects following equation (1.5).
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Table 1.6: Regression Analysis - Bank level abnormal returns and bank char-
acteristics
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Market Return 1.2196*** 1.2186*** 1.2186*** 1.2189*** 1.2195***
Euro-Market Return -0.2676*** -0.2668*** -0.2667*** -0.2670*** -0.2680***
Systemic Size -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001
Sovereign Exposure Ratio -0.0059 -0.0059 -0.0056 -0.0058 -0.0061
Liquidity Ratio - 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
Equity Ratio -0.0146* -0.0143* -0.0143* -0.0144* -0.0153**
ROA 0.0181*** 0.0174*** 0.0165*** 0.0172*** 0.0179***
Size -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0025
Z-score 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Financial Aid Approved
t = -1 0.0053 - - - -
t = 0 0.0121* - - - -
t = +1 0.0088* - - - -
Financial Aid Request
t = -1 - 0.0014 - - -
t = 0 - -0.0121 - - -
t = +1 - -0.0185* - - -
Forecast Revision
t = -1 - - -0.0075*** - -
t = 0 - - -0.0019 - -
t = +1 - - -0.0035* - -
Sovereign Downgrade
t = -1 - - - 0.0006 -
t = 0 - - - -0.0054*** -
t = +1 - - - -0.0069*** -
Suspension of Eligibility
t = -1 - - - - -0.0097***
t = 0 - - - - -0.0289***
t = +1 - - - - 0.0018
Constant 0.0166 0.0169 0.0160 0.0161 0.0185
N 76329 76329 76329 76329 76329
Adj.R2 0.306 0.306 0.306 0.306 0.306
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
The dependent variable is each bank’s Stock Return. Local Market Index is the return for the
corresponding country specific benchmark index. Euro Market Index stands for the return of a common
benchmark index. Systemic Size is defined as banks’ total liabilities to home country’s GDP ratio.
Sovereign Exposure Ratio is the ratio between bank’s net sovereign debt holding of their home country
to total assets. Liquidity Ratio is the ratio between banks’ cash holdings to banks’ total assets. Equity
Ratio is the ratio of banks’ equity to total asset. Size is the natural logarithm of banks’ total assets.
z-score is estimated using the equity’s volatility for all the period under analysis. Column (1) presents
the information for Financial Aid Approved events, column (2) presents the results for the Financial Aid
Request events. Column (3) shows the results for the Forecast Revision dummy, and column (4) for
Sovereign Downgrades events. Column (5) uses the Suspension of Eligibility events. The coefficients for
t = −1 corresponds to the abnormal reaction on bank’s returns the day before the event takes place.
The coefficients for t = 0 and t = +1 correspond to the reaction on the day of the event, and the day
following the even respectively. All regressions are using bank and year fixed effects.
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Table 1.7: Bank’s Abnormal Returns - 3, 5 & 7 days CAR - w/bank level
characteristics
Type (1) (2) (3)
Fin. Aid Approved 0.0261** 0.0276** 0.0515***
Fin. Aid Request -0.0292** -0.0512** -0.0365**
Forecast Revision -0.0128*** -0.0073* -0.0095
Sovereign Downgrade -0.0117*** -0.0153*** -0.0140**
Susp. of Elig. -0.0369*** -0.0245** 0.0012
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Column (1) presents the information for the 3-day windows (-1,+1), column (2) for the
5-day windows (-1,+3), and column (3) do so for the 7-day windows (-3,+3). Results
correspond to the analysis of different event windows estimated using the model
controlling for bank level characteristics, including sovereign exposure. All regressions
are using bank and year fixed effects.
Table 1.8: Banks’ Abnormal Returns - Size interactions
Type (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fin. Aid Approved 0.0207 0.0185 0.0151 0.0211*
Fin. Aid Request -0.024** -0.0211* -0.022** -0.0224**
Forecast Revision -0.0046 -0.0086** -0.0127*** -0.014***
Sovereign Downgrade -0.0097** -0.0086*** -0.0095*** -0.0108***
Susp. of Elig. -0.0397*** -0.0397*** -0.0409*** -0.0348***
Fin. Aid Ap. × size-X% 0.0078 0.0156 0.0541 0.1271
Fin. Aid Req. × size-X% -0.0087 -0.0194 -0.0374 -0.106
Forecast Rev. × size-X% -0.0184** -0.0133* -0.003 0.0314**
Sov. Down. × size-X% -0.0046 -0.0092 -0.0141 -0.0256
Susp. of Elig. × size-X% 0.007 0.007 0.0216** (omitted)
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Coefficients estimated using a 3-days event window (-1,+1). Column (1) presents the
interactions using a 10% size-threshold dummy. Column (2) uses a 25% while column
(3) a 50% threshold dummy. Finally column (4) presents the interactions using a 100%
size-threshold dummy. Results correspond to the analysis using the basic model
including interactions between size-thresholds and event dummy variables (equation 1.3).
All regressions are using bank and year fixed effects.
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Table 1.9: Banks’ Abnormal Returns - Size interactions and bank level char-
acteristics
Type (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fin. Aid Approved 0.0213 0.0192 0.0156 0.0217*
Fin. Aid Request -0.0234* -0.0204* -0.0215** -0.0218**
Forecast Revision -0.0041 -0.0080** -0.0123*** -0.0136***
Sovereign Downgrade -0.0100** -0.0086*** -0.0093*** -0.0105***
Susp. of Elig. -0.0404*** -0.0407*** -0.0431*** -0.0368***
Fin. Aid Ap. × size-X% 0.0075 0.0151 0.0551 0.1244
Fin. Aid Req. × size-X% -0.0088 -0.0196 -0.0369 -0.1092
Forecast Rev. × size-X% -0.0190** -0.0145* -0.0025 0.0285**
Sov. Down. × size-X% -0.0035 -0.0086 -0.0137 -0.0287
Susp. of Elig. × size-X% 0.0053 0.0056 0.023** (omitted)
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Coefficients estimated using a 3-days event window (-1,+1). Column (1) presents the
interactions using a 10% size-threshold dummy. Column (2) uses a 25% while column
(3) a 50% threshold dummy. Finally column (4) presents the interactions using a 100%
size-threshold dummy. Results correspond to the analysis using the basic model,
including interactions between size-thresholds and event dummy variables (equation 1.3)
controlling for bank level characteristics as well. All regressions are using bank and year
fixed effects.
Table 1.10: Large vs. Small banks’ portfolios - 3 days CAR
Type (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fin. Aid Approved -0.0105 -0.0123 0.0218 -0.01
Fin. Aid Request 0.0288 0.0278 0.0017 -0.0435
Forecast Revision -0.0064 0.0018 0.0115 0.0607
Sovereign Downgrade 0.0067 0.0047 -0.0026 0.0083
Susp. of Elig. 0.02*** 0.0215*** 0.033*** 0.0171***
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
We split banks in to groups for each country/year, i.e. large vs small banks (using
different thresholds). The mean return for each group is computed. The difference
between these groups is the main dependent variable in this regression, using our
previous set of dummy variables as in equation (1.4). Coefficients are estimated using a
3-days event window (-1,+1). Column (1) presents the results using a 10% size-threshold
to differentiate groups. Column (2) uses a 25% while column (3) a 50% and column (4)
uses a 100% size-threshold. All regressions are using country and year fixed effects.
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Table 1.11: Large vs. Small banks’ portfolios - 5 days CAR
Type (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fin. Aid Approved 0.0046 -0.0027 0.0255* 0.0095
Fin. Aid Request 0.0422 0.0352 0.039* -0.0429
Forecast Revision 0.0022 0.0091 0.0006 0.0728*
Sovereign Downgrade 0.022** 0.0206** -0.0011 0.0159
Susp. of Elig. 0.0189*** 0.0197*** 0.0404*** 0.0542***
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
We split banks in to groups for each country/year, i.e. large vs small banks (using
different thresholds). The mean return for each group is computed. The difference
between these groups is the main dependent variable in this regression, using our
previous set of dummy variables as in equation (1.4). Coefficients are estimated using a
5-days event window (-1,+3). Column (1) presents the results using a 10% size-threshold
to differentiate groups. Column (2) uses a 25% while column (3) a 50% and column (4)
uses a 100% size-threshold. All regressions are using country and year fixed effects.
Table 1.12: Large vs. Small banks’ portfolios - 7 days CAR
Type (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fin. Aid Approved -0.008 -0.0013 0.0062 0.0165***
Fin. Aid Request 0.0391 0.0184 0.0019 -0.0634
Forecast Revision 0.0005 0.0058 -0.0017 0.0686*
Sovereign Downgrade 0.0224 0.0218* -0.0161 -0.0018
Susp. of Elig. -0.0144** -0.0136** 0.0314*** 0.0718***
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
We split banks in to groups for each country/year, i.e. large vs small banks (using
different thresholds). The mean return for each group is computed. The difference
between these groups is the main dependent variable in this regression, using our
previous set of dummy variables as in equation (1.4). Coefficients are estimated using a
7-days event window (-3,+3). Column (1) presents the results using a 10% size-threshold
to differentiate groups. Column (2) uses a 25% while column (3) a 50% and column (4)
uses a 100% size-threshold. All regressions are using country and year fixed effects.
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Table 1.13: Cross section analysis - Financial Aid Approved events
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size 0.0022 0.0775* 0.0190 0.0099 0.0196
Systemic Size 0.0418 - - - -
Sys.Size 10% - -0.0768 - - -
Sys.Size 25% - - -0.0016 - -
Sys.Size 50% - - - 0.0225 -
Sys.Size 100% - - - - -0.0364
Govt.debt ratio -0.2052** -0.1197 -0.1813* -0.1964** -0.1856**
Sov. Exposure 0.6677* 0.7673* 0.6404 0.6793* 0.6432
N 57 57 57 57 57
Adj.R2 0.5386 0.5652 0.5361 0.5407 0.5398
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
The dependent variable is each bank’s Abnormal Return for a 3-day period estimated
using the simple model from equation (1.1) computed with bank and day fixed effects.
Size is the natural logarithm of banks’ total assets. Systemic Size is banks’ total
liabilities to GDP ratio. Sys.Size X% is a dummy that equals 1 if bank’s systemic size is
above the X% threshold. Govt. debt ratio is total public debt to GDP. Sov. Exposure is
the ratio between bank’s sovereign debt holdings from their home country and total
assets. We include other bank level controls: Liquidity Ratio, Equity Ratio, ROA and
z-score. Cross section regressions is estimated using country and year fixed effects.
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Table 1.14: Cross section analysis - Financial Aid Request events
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size 0.0151 0.0117 0.0065 0.0132 0.0245
Systemic Size 0.0164 - - - -
Sys.Size 10% - 0.0140 - - -
Sys.Size 25% - - 0.0212 - -
Sys.Size 50% - - - 0.0203 -
Sys.Size 100% - - - - -0.0169
Debt to GDP 0.3962*** 0.3844*** 0.3875*** 0.4005*** 0.3776***
Sov. Exposure 1.5116** 1.6040** 1.8575** 1.3600** 1.6385**
N 29 29 29 29 29
Adj.R2 0.7290 0.7310 0.7393 0.7397 0.7321
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
The dependent variable is each bank’s abnormal return for a 3-day period estimated
using the simple model from equation (1.1) computed with bank and day fixed effects.
Size is the natural logarithm of banks’ total assets. Systemic Size is banks’ total
liabilities to GDP ratio. Sys.Size X% is a dummy that equals 1 if bank’s systemic size is
above the X% threshold. Govt. debt ratio is total public debt to GDP. Sov. Exposure is
the ratio between bank’s sovereign debt holdings from their home country and total
assets. We include other bank level controls: Liquidity Ratio, Equity Ratio, ROA and
z-score. Cross section regressions is estimated using country and year fixed effects.
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Table 1.15: Cross section analysis - Forecast Revision events
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size -0.0181* -0.0041 -0.0106 -0.0138 -0.0113
Systemic Size 0.0315 - - - -
Sys.Size 10% -0.0108 - - -
Sys.Size 25% 0.0026 - -
Sys.Size 50% 0.0147 -
Sys.Size 100% - - - - 0.0301**
Debt to GDP 0.0703 0.0792 0.0744 0.0734 0.0730
Sov. Exposure -0.1372 -0.1286 -0.1538 -0.1360 -0.1469
N 184 184 184 184 184
Adj.R2 0.1080 0.1035 0.1005 0.1075 0.1083
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
The dependent variable is each bank’s abnormal return for a 3-day period estimated
using the simple model from equation (1.1) computed with bank and day fixed effects.
Size is the natural logarithm of banks’ total assets. Systemic Size is banks’ total
liabilities to GDP ratio. Sys.Size X% is a dummy that equals 1 if bank’s systemic size is
above the X% threshold. Govt. debt ratio is total public debt to GDP. Sov. Exposure is
the ratio between bank’s sovereign debt holdings from their home country and total
assets. We include other bank level controls: Liquidity Ratio, Equity Ratio, ROA and
z-score. Cross section regressions is estimated using country and year fixed effects.
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Table 1.16: Cross section analysis - Sovereign Downgrade events
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size -0.0138 -0.0136 -0.0168** -0.0124* -0.0112*
Systemic Size 0.0074 - - - -
Sys.Size 10% - 0.0040 - - -
Sys.Size 25% - - 0.0104 - -
Sys.Size 50% - - - 0.0027 -
Sys.Size 100% - - - - -0.0028
Debt to GDP -0.1392* -0.1414* -0.1427* -0.1396* -0.1411*
Sov. Exposure 0.2402* 0.2283 0.2444* 0.2385* 0.2338
N 210 210 210 210 210
Adj.R2 0.2195 0.2195 0.2224 0.2193 0.2191
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
The dependent variable is each bank’s abnormal return for a 3-day period estimated
using the simple model from equation (1.1) computed with bank and day fixed effects.
Size is the natural logarithm of banks’ total assets. Systemic Size is banks’ total
liabilities to GDP ratio. Sys.Size X% is a dummy that equals 1 if bank’s systemic size is
above the X% threshold. Govt. debt ratio is total public debt to GDP. Sov. Exposure is
the ratio between bank’s sovereign debt holdings from their home country and total
assets. We include other bank level controls: Liquidity Ratio, Equity Ratio, ROA and
z-score. Cross section regressions is estimated using country and year fixed effects.
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Figures
Figure 1.1: Gross debt to GDP ratio & Deficit to GDP ratio
(a) Gross debt to GDP ratio
(b) Deficit to GDP ratio
Source: Author’s Elaboration based on Eurostat data
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Figure 1.2: Financial aid agreement: Mean daily return around event
Figure 1.3: Financial aid request: Mean daily return around event
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Figure 1.4: Forecast revision: Mean daily return around event
Figure 1.5: Moody’s downgrade: Mean daily return around event
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Figure 1.6: Suspension of eligibility: Mean daily return around event
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Data Appendix
The parameters used in LexisNexis to look for ‘Forecast Revisions’ are:
• Dates: Jan.01, 2007 Dec.31, 2012.
• Countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain.
• Subjects: Public Finance (alternatively we used: Gov. Budget + Gov.
Grants and Subs. + Public Debt + Taxes and Taxation).
• Sources: Bloomberg Transcripts, Financial Times Online Archive, Fi-
nancial Times (London) Archive, The New York Times, Wall Street
Journal Abstracts and Wall Street Journal Report.
• Keywords:
Forecast + debt,
Forecast AND deficit,
Forecast AND deficit AND (revise OR revision) AND (Greece OR
Ireland OR Italy OR Portugal OR Spain).
It is worth mentioning that in general the events do not overlap consid-
ering a [-5,+5] window. There are a few exceptions for this.
On April 22nd, 2010, we find 2 different events for Greece. Moody’s
downgrade by 1 notch Greeks sovereigns and Eurostat announces an upward
forecast revision on the level of debt. Both events are likely to move bank’s
returns on the same direction so it does not generate a problem.
Additionally the following day (April 23rd, 2010) Greece formally request
financial aid from the EU. The expected reaction of bank’s returns is not clear
ex ante. The effect of the previous events might not go on the same direction.
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If this is the case we might interpret that there is not a significant reaction,
when this could not be the case. A similar situation occurs for Portugal on
April 2011. On the 5th, Moody’s downgraded Portuguese sovereign by one
notch. The following day, Portugal requests the activation of aid mechanism.
For both cases, we can interpret the financial aid request (from Greece and
Portugal) as a reaction from the previous downgrade.
If we extend the window we find one case in which Moody’s downgrades
the Portuguese sovereign (by 4 notches into speculative grade) on July 5th,
2011. Two days afterwards, the ECB suspends any restrictions on the use of
Portuguese bonds as collateral. We can interpret the ECB announcement as
a reaction to the first event.
A similar situation occurs for Greece on July 21st, 2011. A second bailout
is approved (which included some comments on “voluntary contribution of
the private sector”, or selective default). On July 25th Moody’s downgraded
3 notches Greek debt rating (considering only trading days, these events
would be separated by two days). Nevertheless we expect both events to go
in the same direction.
Further increasing the window, we find some overlapping considering
wider event windows. If we restrict its size, we avoid all of these prob-
lems. Additionally when using the regression analysis, overlapping would
not generate any problem, even in wider event windows.
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Chapter 2
Risk transfer and implicit
insurance: The effect of banks’
downgrades on sovereign debt
2.1 Introduction
During the last crisis many financial institutions were under severe distress.
Explicit safety nets (e.g. deposit insurance schemes) and implicit guaran-
tees (‘Too Big to Fail’-TBTF subsidies) became more important for banks
and other thrift institutions. Governments around the globe decided to bail
out banks providing liquidity support, recapitalization programs, or offering
larger guarantees on their liabilities (extending the safety nets coverage). But
these government guarantees come at a cost since bank’s financial instability
was passed on to governments leading to a sovereign debt crisis (Dieckmann
and Plank, 2012; Acharya et al., 2014; Leonello, 2015). This situation further
worsened banks financial health due to a ‘diabolic loop’ (Acharya and Rajan,
2013; Gennaioli et al., 2014; Acharya and Steffen, 2015).
The link between the financial sector and sovereign default risk is a rela-
tively new problem for advanced economies. A good example of this situation
is the case of Ireland (Figure 2.1). After the Irish government announced a
54
full insurance on all deposits for all major banks (September, 2008), there
was a steep increase in the Irish sovereign CDS spread. On the other hand
Iceland seems to be an interesting counter-factual: when it was clear that the
Icelandic government was not going to bailout the financial system, spreads
fell significantly (Acharya et al., 2014).
The sovereign crisis led to a related problem. Impaired governments are
less likely to be able to extend guarantees to financial institutions. Then
larger banks might become ‘Too Big to Save’ (TBTS ) (Allen et al., 2011a;
Bertay et al., 2013; Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013; Zaghini, 2014). The
Icelandic case, where foreign depositors from larger banks were not rescued,
illustrates this situation. This should reduce the link between the financial
sector and governments, but at the cost of increasing the ‘systemicity’ of
these banks.1
In order to complement the existing literature I propose an event study
similar to that of Ongena et al. (2003), and Afonso et al. (2012). For a num-
ber of Western Europe countries during the last financial crisis I examine
the effects of downgrades on banks’ financial strength ratings (Moody’s In-
vestors Service, 2013), a standalone rating, on sovereign bond spreads. These
downgrades are considered as discrete increases in banks’ default risk (Bil-
lett et al., 1998). Focusing on a crisis periods, allows for better quality in
the rating process (Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2013). Additionally the event
study methodology allows me to clearly quantify the effect of an increase in
bank risk on sovereigns bonds while reducing endogeneity problems associ-
ated with the causality channel. To the extent that there is a risk transfer
from the financial system to sovereigns, we should expected an increase in
1As a result from this situation regulators have been requested directly intervene banks’
size (Huizinga and Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, 2011; Millstein, 2011). Nevertheless this might not
necessarily make them safer: many small banks can generate a deep crisis just as one large
banks since the risk on their balances is in general more concentrated (Dewatripont, 2014)
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spreads after a downgrade on a bank: Downgraded banks have higher default
risk, increasing the need of potential bailouts (or other forms of government
support). If these are financed with new debt, there would be a dilution on
existing debt-holders, increasing their risk exposure.
Since this risk transfer is consistent with the idea of future bailout expec-
tations (Dieckmann and Plank, 2012; Leonello, 2015), we can assess whether
large banks are still regarded as TBTF by the market, or if some of them
have become TBTS. If markets consider that some of the larger banks are
not supported by governments anymore i.e. they are TBTS, the effect on
spreads should not be significantly larger for bigger banks (since the bank is
not expected to receive a bailout, sovereign debt levels should not change as
much). On the other hand if larger banks are still deemed asTBTF, down-
grades on these banks would have a stronger effect on sovereigns (Dieckmann
and Plank, 2012; Acharya et al., 2014).
The evidence from the event study suggests a significant risk transfer
from banks to sovereigns. The average immediate increase in daily sovereign
spreads after a downgrade is about 2.11 basis points -bps- (for the Euro-
area countries in the sample). Splitting downgrades between those leading
to speculative grades or that deepens the bank into this category (i.e. high
risk downgrades), and those in which the bank remains within investment
grade category (i.e. low risk downgrades), modify the main results. Low risk
downgrades do not imply a statistically significant change in spreads (less
than 1 bps), i.e. there is little risk transfer in this cases. But for high risk
downgrades, the immediate average effect on the daily change of spread rises
to 2.99 bps (for the Euro-area sample), i.e. there is a significant risk transfer.
In general, each downgraded notch leads to an average increase in spreads
of 1.3 bps. Whenever the downgrade takes place in a distressed economy, it
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leads to an additional increase (over non-distressed economies) of 2.04 bps
on spreads, i.e. for distressed countries the risk-transfer means a more severe
problem to the government. The main results and conclusions remain mostly
unchanged after a battery of robustness checks.
Additionally, results suggest that creditors are, in general, expecting a
bailout on downgraded banks. Furthermore, the expected value of being
bailed out is more important for larger banks. Particularly, when a bank
with systemic size of at least 50% is downgraded, there is an additional ef-
fect (over smaller banks) of 2.06 bps on spreads.2 Setting this threshold at
100%, the additional effect on spreads raises about 2.32 bps. In general it
seems that as the size of downgraded banks increases, the effect on spreads
is significantly larger. These results are consistent with the idea that mar-
kets consider that large banks are still implicitly insured by governments.
Nevertheless, analyzing downgrades of systemically large banks located in
distressed economies, I find different results. The effect of downgrades to
large banks located in GIIPS economies on spreads is lower that the average
effect. Particularly if a downgrade (within speculative grades) on a large
bank (systemic size larger than 100%) occurs in a distressed economy, there
is a significantly lower impact on spreads. These elements are consistent with
the idea that large banks located in distressed countries, might be considered
as TBTS. Finally, I perform a cross-sectional analysis.The results confirm the
finding that downgrades on larger banks induce a wider increase in spreads,
while downgrades on systemically larger banks are less harmful in terms of
risk transfer (even after controlling for other bank’s characteristics). This
analysis also allows to indirectly test for the existence of a ‘Too Many to
Fail’ (TMTF ) problem, when multiple downgrades on relatively small banks
2Following previous literature, banks’ systemic size is measured as the ratio of bank’s
total liabilities to home country’s GDP.
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occur. Nevertheless I find no evidence that these multiple downgrades imply
a larger risk transfer, at least for the sample used.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First,
using a novel approach I am able to confirm and quantify the degree of risk
transfer from banks to sovereigns (Acharya et al., 2014). To the extent of
my knowledge, this is the first paper that relates banks’ rating downgrades
to sovereign bond spreads, increasing our understanding on the relationship
between the financial and the public sectors. The event study methodology
allows me to reduce more severe endogeneity problems that other method-
ologies might have, while establishing a clearer causal link from banks to
sovereigns. 3 An additional advantage of the methodology is the neat way to
interpret the results in terms of changes in spreads. Another novel feature is
the use of banks’ standalone rating downgrades as a signal of increased de-
fault risk, a documented fact in the literature (Billett et al., 1998). Results
complement the literature on the utility of credit ratings, and the informa-
tion transmission to the markets (Afonso et al., 2012). Furthermore, the
paper also contributes to the literature on implicit guarantees to the finan-
cial system (Bertay et al., 2013; Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013). Using
an European sample poses several improvements: it allows for the existence
of ‘systemic banks’ (a feature that a US sample might not permit) while
preserving some heterogeneity as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a liter-
ature review. Section 3 explains the methodology and data used. Section
4 presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes. In appendix A
I present additional explanation on Bank Financial Strength Ratings. In
appendix B some clarifications on data is presented, while the results of
3However we can not be sure that they are completely overcome as argued by Roberts
and Whited (2012)
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some unit-root tests are in appendix C. Finally appendix D, presents some
supplementary tables with summary statistics and additional results from
robustness analyses.
2.2 Literature Review
There are several recent papers explaining the close link between the financial
and the public sector. Acharya and Rajan (2013) and Gennaioli et al. (2014)
develop theoretical frameworks to analyze the reasons and consequences of
sovereign debt holdings by banks. On a similar line Acharya and Steffen
(2015) empirically find a carry trade behavior by banks, i.e. banks increased
their long-term periphery sovereign holdings using short-term debt in order
to increase profits.
Closely related to this paper, Acharya et al. (2014) and Leonello (2015) ex-
plain from a theoretical perspective the interplay between bank and sovereign
risks. Government guarantees and bailout expectations arise as the main rea-
son for this link. Additionally, Acharya et al. (2014) finds empirical evidence
of this link analyzing the relationship between banks and sovereigns CDS
spreads, before during and after the financial crisis. Analyzing sovereign
CDS spreads and their relationship with the health of the financial sector,
Dieckmann and Plank (2012) find evidence consistent with a risk transfer
between banks and public sector arising due to bailout expectations.
These bailout expectation are closely related with the existence of im-
plicit guarantees in the form of TBTF subsidies. There is a vast literature
on these issues. O’Hara and Shaw (1990) use an event study and find that
banks deemed as TBTF had a positive wealth effect when bailout expecta-
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tions were increased.4 Penas and Unal (2004) analyze bond price reaction to
M&A announcements and find evidence consistent with the TBTF implicit
insurance.
But this implicit insurance might be reduced if banks are considered
TBTS. Allen et al. (2011a) argue that financially distressed governments
might not be able to honor their guarantees for larger banks. Analyzing the
relationship between banks’ systemic size (liabilities-to-GDP ratio) and some
market discipline measures, Bertay et al. (2013) find evidence for the TBTS
situation. Similarly Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) find empirical sup-
port for the TBTS hypothesis when analyzing banks’ equity prices (for the
1991-2008 period) and CDS spreads (for the 2001-2008 period). This prob-
lem is particularly severe for systemically large banks located in countries
with poor fiscal balances.
Finally this paper is related to the use of rating downgrades. There are
several studies that relate banks’ ratings with market discipline and safety-
nets. For instance Billett et al. (1998) use Moody’s downgrades as a proxy
for “discrete changes in bank risk”, or Rime (2005) that analyzes ratings
from Fitch and Moody’s to assess if implicit insurance pushes banks’ ratings
upward. Morgan (2002) finds significant discrepancies between agencies’ rat-
ings for banks, given the inner opaqueness of the banking industry. With
respect to ratings’ explanatory power to predict sovereign yields, Afonso
et al. (2012) find that downgrades on sovereigns lead to a significant increase
in spreads. Additionally they find that ratings announcements are not an-
ticipated on the previous months. Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) develop a
theoretical framework to explain that rating agencies release higher quality
4In 1984, after the bailout of Continental Illinois Bank, the comptroller of the currency
(testifying at the Congress) admitted that if needed larger banks would be granted financial
aid. On that session congressman McKinney admitted that “We have a new kind of bank.
It is called too big to fail.”
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ratings (more accurate) during recession due to reputation issues.
2.3 Data and methodology
2.3.1 Data
I gather information for daily yields to redemption for 10 year sovereign bonds
from Datastream. These yields are estimated using the price of a single
underlying bond. Datastream uses a benchmark bond for this estimation
that is reviewed each month. In general it is represented by the latest issue
or the most representative one, within that maturity.
The sample period starts on January, 3rd 2005, until December, 31st 2013.
Countries under analysis are shown in table 2.1. Following Afonso et al.
(2012) I use German bond’s yield to construct the spreads. Since German
bonds are regarded as a ‘safe haven’ (Bernoth et al., 2012), they can be used
as a ‘risk-less’ rate. Furthermore, it is useful to control for common shocks
across countries. Due to currency exchange concerns, I analyze separately the
subsample of euro-area countries. I end up with a panel of 23,460 country-
day observations on the ‘Full-Sample’ and 18,768 for the ‘Euro-Sample’ (see
the appendix for a summary statistics on these observations).
In the time period under analysis, banks were severely constrained in-
creasing the value of government guarantees. Additionally some of these Eu-
ropean countries were financially impaired, with high ratios of government
debt to GDP and high borrowing costs. These elements limit governments
ability to bailout banks, setting the proper environment for a TBTS situation
to arise.
Using the research and ratings module from Moody’s, I hand collected
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a series of ‘Bank Financial Strength Rating’ (BFSR) downgrades.5 These
are assessments on banks’ intrinsic strengths, i.e. they do not consider any
form of external support. These are the main inputs to obtain the final
ratings banks (see appendix for additional information). Downgrades can
be used as indicators of increasing risk for banks (Billett et al., 1998). I
collected information on all downgrades for all registered banks within the
set of countries in the sample, for the time period under analysis. I end up
with 476 downgrades for 180 different banks (the appendix presents some
statistics on these downgrades). There are 283 cases in which more than one
bank is downgraded on a single day in the country, and only 193 cases in
which the bank was the only one downgraded in the day (downgrades occur
either for individual banks, or for a group of banks.). Then I end up with
253 events distributed across 10 countries: 193 with a single downgrade, and
60 with multiple downgrades. Table 2.1 presents the distribution of events
by country.
Then I transform the standalone grade into a numeric variable (from
A = 1, to E = 13) and classify downgrades according to it. There are cases
in which a downgrade leads to a speculative grade, while others keep the bank
within investment grades. Then I classify downgrades between ‘investment ’
or ‘speculative’. In 127 days, these downgrades led to a speculative grade,
i.e. lower or equal than D+ (the standalone equivalent to a ba1 all in-rating
for Moody’s). Table 2.1 presents this information while table 2.2 shows some
statistics on the downgrades (for additional information see the appendix).
In those cases with more than one downgrade in a single day (and within
the same country), it will be classified as investment or speculative depending
on the grade of the largest bank. If the grade of this bank is speculative,
5For the period under analysis, S&P did not provide standalone ratings, while Fitch’s
individual ratings were not as easily accessible as Moody’s BFSR.
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regardless of the rest of the banks’ grades, the downgrade is classified as
a speculative one. In the appendix I present the results for two different
alternatives to classify the grade in these cases: using the simple mean of the
grades for all downgraded banks on the day, or alternatively as the weighted
average of the grades (using as coefficients the relative size of each bank).
Table 2.1 presents a summary of the days with downgrades and speculative
downgrades (using the three alternatives).
Accounting data for banks is from Bankscope. Since Moody’s does not
provide any standard code to identify banks, merging downgrades with ac-
counting information followed a manual process. GDP data (needed to esti-
mate banks’ systemic size) comes from Eurostat.
Figure 2.2 presents the spreads for each individual country under analysis.
From this figure it seems clear that these processes are not stationary. Using
a unit-root test we can not reject the hypothesis that the variable, in levels,
has a unit-root (see the appendix). For this reason I use the first difference
of spreads.
2.3.2 Event study methodology and hypotheses
I use the event study methodology to test the effect of bank’s downgrades on
sovereigns. Additionally, I assess whether banks’ size is an important factor.
Finally, I also distinguish between troubled and more stable economies in the
analysis.
When using the traditional event study methodology (Kothari and Warner,
2007), one has to estimate a market model using a normal time period (i.e.
time period with no events). Then using this estimated model, we can assess
the abnormal reaction for days in which there are events. Nevertheless, in
this study I do not have enough observations to update the estimated model
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between event dates. For this reason I rely on the observed sovereign spreads,
following the approach proposed by Ongena et al. (2003) and Afonso et al.
(2012).
I use an autoregressive model of order one, using as dependent variable
the change in 10 year sovereign spreads between the day of the event and
the following day. The independent variable is the corresponding first lag.
In order to account for the effect of the downgrades I a use dummy variable,
which equals one on the day of the event and zero otherwise. This dummy
captures the abnormal return on the corresponding day. Given the panel of
data, it is possible to use country fixed effects to control for unobserved het-
erogeneity among countries. Additionally, I also introduce year fixed effects
to account for unobserved variables affecting countries throughout time.
∆Si,t = αi + yt + β∆Si,t−1 +
+τ∑
k=−τ
γkδi,(t+k) + εi,t (2.1)
Where ∆Si,t is the change on spreads for country ‘i’, between day ‘t+1’
and ‘t’. The variable αi stands for the country fixed effects, while yt rep-
resents the year fixed effects. The variable δi,(t+k) is the event dummy that
takes value one if there is an event in country ‘i’, on day ‘t’, with an event
window of size ‘k’.6 Finally i,t is an error term assumed to be normally
distributed with zero mean.
Using a set of additional dummy variables in the days that follow and
precede the event, we get the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the
corresponding event window. For instance the CAR[-1,+1] is given by:
CARi,t (−1,+1) = γi,−1 + γi,0 + γi,+1
6The total effect for a particular day would be given by ∂∆S∂δ =
γk
1−β where β is the
coefficient for lagged change in spreads
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To the extent that there exists a link between banks and the public sector,
I expect that downgrades on banks’ ratings will imply an increase in sovereign
spreads consistent with a risk transfer.
H1a: Downgrades on BFSR lead to an increase in sovereign spreads. This
is consistent with a risk transfer from the financial sector to the sovereigns.
If this link arises due to implicit guarantees and bailout expectations,
downgrades leaving banks in the ‘verge of default’ should imply a larger
reaction. After all these banks are more likely to need of external support.
In order to differentiate between investment and speculative downgrades I
modify equation (2.1) to capture this difference:
∆Si,t = αi + yt + β∆Si,t−1 +
+τ∑
k=−τ
γIkδ
I
i,(t+k) +
+τ∑
k=−τ
γSk δ
S
i,(t+k) + εi,t (2.2)
In this case δIi,(t+k) represents the dummy variable that accounts for in-
vestment downgrades, while δSi,(t+k) stands for the speculative downgrades
variable. I expect that the effect on sovereigns, should be stronger when the
downgrade leads to a speculative grade rating (or deepens the bank into it).
H1b: Downgrades on BFSR leading to speculative grade (or deepening banks
into this category), have a higher impact on sovereign spreads. This means
that the risk transfer is more significant when banks are regarded as riskier.
Within the speculative grade downgrades, we are including two different
cases. First, those cases in which the bank was downgraded from investment
to a non-investment grade (at least D+ in terms of the BFSR). Additionally,
it also includes downgrades for banks that were already within the speculative
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grade. For this reason I include an additional dummy variable (First Spec.,
δfirst) that takes value one whenever the downgrade leads to a speculative
grade from an investment grade, and zero otherwise.
The idea is to test whether speculative downgrades are different when
they occur within the range of speculative grades compared to those cases
in which the bank has just fallen into speculative grades. In the following
equation, I capture the additional impact of falling into speculative grades:
∆Si,t = αi + yt + β∆Si,t−1 + γIδIi,t + γ
SδSi,t + λδ
FS
i,t + εi,t (2.3)
2.3.3 Including the effect of size
If the relationship between financial and public sector is due to government
guarantees, we should expect that larger banks (those implicitly insured by
the TBTF subsidy) generate a deeper reaction on sovereigns. In order to
assess market’s perception on the TBTF hypothesis, I include the systemic
size in the analysis. For this purpose I follow two different strategies:
• First, I include an additional term in equation (2.1): the interaction
between the downgrade dummy and the size of the downgraded bank.
Whenever there is more than one downgrade, I use the size of the
largest bank.7 If banks are regarded as TBTF, downgrades on larger
banks should lead to a wider increase on sovereigns spreads.
• But the relationship between size and government support likelihood
does not have to be linear. Then, following Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga
(2013) I use a set of dummy variables to account for banks’ size, i.e.
7As robustness, I use a different approach to measure the ‘size’ whenever there are
multiple downgrades. I compute it as the average size among all downgraded banks. Final
conclusions remain mostly unchanged. The appendix presents these results.
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greater or equal than 10%, 25%, 50% and 100%. As before I interact
these dummies with the downgrades dummies. If banks are deemed as
TBTF, I expect that the effect on spreads is higher for larger banks.
Then I estimate the following equation:
∆Si,t = αi + yt + β∆Si,t−1 + γδi,t + ηδi,tsizeX% + εi,t (2.4)
The variable size
X%
represents the systemic size of the downgraded bank
(either in level, or using the aforementioned thresholds). The value and
direction of η in the following expression is the object of the analysis.
H2: BFSR downgrades on larger banks have a significantly stronger effect
on sovereign spreads if markets consider that these banks are still implicitly
insured. This is consistent with a risk transfer due to government guarantees.
2.3.4 Distinguishing the effects on troubled economies
The risk transfer might be dependent on the financial health of the coun-
try. If governments are financially distressed the damage inflicted by banks’
downgrades might be more severe, given their impaired situation. Then in
order to assess the differential effect of downgrades for different economies I
propose an alternative setting. In this environment I differentiate between
GIIPS and non-GIIPS using a dummy variable.
∆Si,t = αi + yt + β∆Si,t−1 + γδi,t + φδi,tGIIPS + εi,t (2.5)
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H3: Downgrades on BFSR to banks located in distressed economies, will
have a larger impact on sovereigns.
Nevertheless, distressed countries’ bailout capacity might be impaired as
well. This means that larger banks might be less likely to receive government
support if needed, i.e. they might be simply TBTS. In this setting we are
able to separate the effects of downgrades depending on the size of the bank
as well as the economy in which the bank is located.
∆Si,t =αi + yt + β∆Si,t−1 + γδi,t + ηδi,tsizeX%
+ φδi,tGIIPS + ϕδi,tsizeX%GIIPS + εi,t
(2.6)
Then we can state some additional hypothesis:
H4: BFSR downgrades on systemically larger banks located in distressed
economies, will have a lower impact on sovereigns if banks are regarded as
TBTS.
2.3.5 Cross-sectional analysis
Additionally, I perform a cross section analysis similar to the traditional event
study methodology (Kothari and Warner, 2007). In this setting I analyze how
banks level characteristics are associated with the change in sovereign spreads
after a downgrade, i.e. how these characteristics affect the risk transfer.
First, I estimate the abnormal change in spreads for each individual down-
grade. In order to do this I create 253 dummy variables: one per day with
event. The corresponding coefficient in the regression analysis will corre-
spond to the abnormal change in spreads (AR), and will be the dependent
variable in the cross-sectional analysis.
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I use the following banks’ characteristics to explain these ARs: size (mea-
sured as the natural logarithm of total assets), systemic size (measured as
the total liabilities to GDP ratio), equity to total assets ratio (as presented
in Bankscope), return on assets (as presented in Bankscope), and the liquid
assets to customer and short term funds ratio (as presented in Bankscope).
8 Dummy variables to distinguish speculative downgrades, and the number
of downgraded notches are included as well.
Finally, I include an additional dummy to capture the effect of multiple
downgrades on a single day. If many banks are downgraded on the same day,
given the TMTF hypothesis, we would expect an increase in the abnormal
change in spreads. But there are many cases in which there is a large bank
within this group. Then in order to have an unbiased indicator (i.e. only
small banks), the TMTF dummy equals one whenever there is more than
one downgraded bank but none of them has a systemic size above 50%.9
Alternatively, I use a different dummy (TMTFalt) that equals one whenever
there is more than one downgrade but the sum of the sizes of all downgraded
banks is lower than 50%.
The cross section analysis allows me to assess if there is a TBTF subsidy
(examining the effect of size), if banks have become TBTS (analyzing the
effect of systemic size), and if there is a TMTF situation (evaluating the
corresponding dummy). This is estimated using a simple OLS with year and
country fixed effects, where ARi,t is the abnormal change in spread generated
by a downgrade on bank i in day t.
8For those cases in which more than one downgrade takes place in the same country-day,
I use the accounting information from the largest bank.
9Conclusions hold for different thresholds, i.e. 25% and 10%. These cases are not
tabulated.
69
ARi,t =αi + yt + β Sizei,t + γ Sys.Sizei,t + δ Equityi,t + η ROAAi,t
+ ϑ Liqi,t + λ TMTFi,t + µ Speci,t + ρ Notchesi,t + εi,t
(2.7)
2.4 Empirical results
2.4.1 Effect of downgrades on sovereign
Figure 2.3 shows the average effect of downgrades on the change in spreads
around the event date (for the Full and Euro samples). In general it seems
that there is an increase in the spreads after a downgrade.
I proceed with the regression analysis as stated in equation (2.1), using all
downgrades to BFSR in the Full sample, to assess their effect on the change
in spreads. Then I consider only the subsample of Euro countries. Results
are presented in Table 2.3 columns (1) and (2). The variable of interest,
Downgrades, has the expected sign and it is significant both in statistical
terms (at a 10% level), and in economic terms as well (when considering the
Full sample). The estimated coefficient for a downgrade is 0.0144%. Consid-
ering that the mean daily change in spreads is (for all statistical purposes)
zero, the effect of the downgrade is economically important. Analyzing the
Euro sample, I find that the variable of interest is larger and displays a higher
statistical significance (5% level). The coefficient for the change in spread is
0.019% (almost 2 bps) on the day following the announcement.
Note that the full effect of downgrades is actually given by the expression
γi,k
1−β . Then, the total effect of downgrades on spreads is around 1.6 bps for
the Full sample and 2.11 bps for the Euro sample. Then downgrades on
70
BFSR lead to an increase in sovereign spreads as expected.
Results suggest that hypothesis H1a is fully supported analyzing both the
Full sample or the Euro sample. It is worth mentioning that the time period
under analysis is characterized by high volatility (the main reason to use
time fixed effects). Winsorizing data to reduce the effect of spurious outliers
would yield similar results (presented in a subsequent subsection).
As previously commented, some of these downgrades leave banks withing
investment grades, e.g. from A to A−. In these cases the bank is still a in
a strong position. It is reasonable that banks within investment grades do
not cause an important impact on sovereign spreads, i.e. since banks’ risk of
default is low the contagion (or risk transfer) effect to governments should be
low as well. A bank that is in a solid position is less likely to need financial
support by the government. For this reason in equation (2.2), I separate the
downgrades into two different groups: those in which the institution remains
within investment grades, and the rest in which the downgrade leads to a
speculative grade category.
Figures 2.5(a) and 2.5(b) present the average effect on the change in
spreads, only for speculative downgrades (using the Full and Euro samples
respectively). Like before, it seems that after a speculative downgrade there
is a significant increase in spreads.
Table 2.3 columns (3) and (4) present the results corresponding to the
estimation of equation (2.2) for the Full and Euro samples respectively. The
difference in behavior between investment and speculative downgrades, is
evident. When analyzing the Full sample, the effect of downgrades for in-
stitutions with investment grades is not significant and the coefficient is eco-
nomically small. If we examine speculative downgrades, the coefficient is
more important in economic terms (2.34 bps) as well as in statistical terms
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(significant at a 5% level). When analyzing the Euro sample previous con-
clusions hold. The coefficient of investment downgrades is not statistically
significant (nor economically important), while the coefficient for speculative
downgrades is economically meaningful (a daily increase of 0.0269%) and
statistically significant (at a 5%).
Again the full effect on spreads is given by the expression
γi,k
1−β , so that
investment downgrades imply an increase of 0.96 bps, while speculative down-
grades imply an increase of 2.99 bps on spreads. This effect in daily spread
changes is economically important.
There is a differential effect for downgrades depending on the final grade of
the bank. The effect is more important when downgrades lead to a speculative
grade (or deepens this status). The riskier the bank the larger the risk
transfer to the sovereigns, as it was expected.
It is worth analyzing two different alternative approaches to assess the ef-
fect of downgrades. In Table 2.3 columns (5) to (8) present the results using
two alternative variables instead if the downgrade dummy. First, Numeric
Grade is a numerical transformation for the final grade, where the high-
est grade (A) corresponds to the lowest number (1). Second, Downgraded
Notches, that is the number of notches that were downgraded for the corre-
sponding bank. For the first variable (columns (5) and (6)), the worse the
final grade (high numeric value) the higher the increase in sovereign spreads.
This reaction in sovereigns is statistically significant at a 5% (considering
both the Full and Euro samples). Additionally, the deeper the downgrade
(more downgraded notches) the higher the effect on sovereigns. This rela-
tionship (significant at a 5%) suggests that for each downgraded notch there
is an increase in spreads of 0.93 bps and 1.3 bps for the Full and Euro samples
respectively.
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Finally recall that speculative downgrades cover two possible cases: the
bank is already within speculative grades and the downgrade deepens this
situation; or the bank is within investment grades and the downgrade leaves
the bank in a non-investment grade. Equation (2.3) separates these effects
and Table 2.3 columns (9) and (10) present the results for the Full and Euro
sample respectively. The additional dummy for first time speculative (δFSi,t )
has a positive coefficient. Nevertheless, this additional effect is not different
from zero in statistical terms. Then the differential effect of becoming a
speculative grade bank is not an important factor driving the results.
In general these findings support the idea that downgrades on banks
financial strength (a proxy for an increase in banks’ risk) have a substan-
tial effect on sovereign spreads (a significant risk transfer). When analyzing
downgrades within the range of speculative grades, the effect becomes signif-
icantly larger. These findings are also supported when considering the final
grade after the downgrade, or the number of downgraded notches. All these
findings provide a strong support for hypotheses H1a and H1b (irrespective of
the sample used). The evidence is consistent with a significant risk transfer
from banks to governments whenever banks’ default risk is increased.
Robustness - Analyzing alternative event windows
I extend the analysis assessing the cumulative abnormal returns for a wider
set of event windows: 3-day CAR (t-1, t+1) and 7-day CAR (t-3, t+3).10
Results are presented on the appendix.
The 3-days CAR shows that the effect of investment downgrades is not
statistically different from zero (both for the Full and Euro samples). When
analyzing speculative downgrades the 3-days CAR is 3.46 bps (significant at
10I analyze the 11-day CAR (t-5, t+5) as well and find that the effect of the events is
not significant. Results are not tabulated.
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a 5% level) and 4.36 bps (significant at a 5 %) for the Full and Euro samples
respectively.
In the very short term around the event day, the effect of an investment
downgrade is irrelevant for spreads. Nevertheless, for speculative downgrades
the effect is very important, consistent with a significant risk transfer in the
short-run.
For the 7-days CAR analysis, investment and speculative downgrades
(using the Full and Euro samples) are not significant (statistically or eco-
nomically).
The evidence shows that the abnormal effect of a downgrade on sovereigns
is concentrated around the event date, i.e. it is not distributed throughout a
long period of time. The abnormal reaction of sovereigns is short-lived, and
disappears when analyzing wider event windows.
Robustness - Alternative classification for speculative grade
I introduce two alternative ways to distinct speculative from investment
downgrades when more than one bank is downgraded. Instead of consid-
ering the grade of the largest bank (first definition), I use the average grade
of all downgraded banks in that day (second definition) or alternatively the
weighted average grade with weights dependent on bank’ size (third defini-
tion). Results are presented on the appendix.
All previous conclusions remain mostly unchanged regardless of the defi-
nition used to define speculative downgrades. The effect that of downgrades
leading to speculative grades remains significant for all the possible cases, and
with similar coefficients. For this reason, throughout the rest of the analysis
I will use the first speculative grade definition.
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2.4.2 The effect of banks’ size
In order to further analyze the hypothesis that there is a risk transfer due to
government guarantees or implicit bailout expectations, I include the size of
the downgraded bank in the analysis as in equation (2.4).
First, I proceed to analyze the effect of size in a linear way interacting
bank’ systemic size (liabilities-to-GDP ratio) with the downgrade dummy.
If the TBTF hypothesis holds I expect that downgrades on larger banks
will lead to larger increases on sovereign spreads. On the other hand, if
the TBTS hypothesis holds, we should find a low non-significant (or even
negative) coefficient.
Table 2.4 column (1) presents the results for the Full sample. Downgrades
on larger banks lead to a larger increase in spreads. On the other hand,
results from the Euro sample show that even though the coefficient of interest
(the interaction term) is larger than before, it is not statistically significant
(column (2)).
Then I split downgrades between investment and speculative grades. In
this case only investment downgrades are significant for large banks (analyz-
ing the Full sample). Surprisingly, speculative downgrades on larger banks
do not have a statistically significant effect on spreads (even if this is eco-
nomically large).
Table 2.4 in columns (3) and (4) summarizes these results (for the Full
and Euro samples respectively). The evidence regarding the effect of bank’
size on sovereigns and market’s perception on potential bailouts is mixed.
Nevertheless, it might be the case that the effect is not linear. In order
to test for this non-linearities regarding the effect of size, I create four set
of dummies for the systemic size (similar to Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga
2013). Variables Size 10%, 25%, 50% and 100% equal 1 if the systemic size of
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the downgraded bank is greater or equal than the corresponding percentage.
If there is more than one downgrade, I consider the size the largest bank (I
explore a different alternative as robustness). Using this methodology we are
able to disentangle the effect caused by larger banks as opposed to smaller
ones with a non-linear setting.
Table 2.5 presents this information. It is straightforward that the addi-
tional effect of being systemically large is important. Note that as we increase
the size of the downgraded bank the additional effect on sovereigns is larger
in economic terms. In fact when the bank is sufficiently large, the effect be-
comes statistically significant. For the Full sample, banks with 50% or 100%
systemic size (columns 5 and 7 ) present an additional effect of magnitude
1.86 and 2.09 bps (significant at the 10% and the 1%) respectively. This sup-
ports the idea that downgrades on large banks generate a wider increase in
spreads, consistent with the idea that larger banks are in general supported
by the implicit governments’ guarantees. Analyzing the Euro sample leads
to the same conclusion. In this case when introducing the size dummies for
50% and 100% the effect is statistically and economically significant again
(columns 6 and 8 from Table 2.5): downgrades on larger banks lead to a
significantly larger increase in spreads. Particularly, the additional effect on
sovereign spreads for downgrades on banks with systemic size larger than
50% is 2.41 bps (significant at a 5%). For the case of banks with systemic
size larger than 100%, there is an extra increase of 2.42 bps on sovereign
spreads (significant at a 5%). These results are consistent with the idea that
larger banks are deemed as TBTF. Markets seem to be discounting a bailout
to these larger banks (due to an implicit insurance), which in turn reflects a
risk transfer from banks to governments.
As before I divide downgrades between speculative and investment. Table
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2.6 present the corresponding results for the Full and Euro samples. For the
Full sample (odd columns) increasing the size of the downgraded bank leads
to a higher increase in spreads. For speculative downgrades, the additional
effect is statistically significant when the bank has a systemic size larger
than 50% (column 5 ). This effect is 5.9 bps and significant at a 1% level.
Surprisingly, for speculative downgrades on banks with systemic size larger
than 100% the effect is not statistically significant (column 7 ). Nevertheless,
for these set of systemically large banks, the additional effect of investment
downgrades is statistically significant. If we turn our attention to the Euro
sample the main conclusions do not change. The additional effect for spec-
ulative downgrades when the bank has a systemic size larger than 50% is
5.95 bps (significant at a 1%). As before, when the downgrade (investment
or speculative) occurs on banks with systemic size over 100% the additional
effect is not statistically significant, though the coefficient is economically
large.
These results are consistent with the TBTF hypothesis, while leaving
some room for the existence of too-big-to-rescue banks. In general down-
grades on larger banks have indeed a more important effect on spreads. This
means that markets are discounting a potential bailout from governments to
larger banks. Nevertheless, these findings do not rule out the existence of
TBTS banks, i.e. the expected bailout for systemically large banks might
not be larger for the bigger banks (as is the case in Table 2.6). In fact there
is evidence consistent with this hypothesis as well.
With the evidence gathered, I can not reject hypothesis H2. The effect
on sovereign spreads of downgrades on large banks is significantly larger
(compared to the average effect). This supports the idea that the risk transfer
from large banks to governments, is significantly larger compared to the
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transfer conveyed by smaller banks. This result is consistent with the idea
that markets are still expecting bailouts for these banks.
Robustness - Different definitions for size
When creating the size dummies with the four different thresholds, I consid-
ered the size of the largest downgraded bank during that day (if more than
one downgrade took place on the corresponding date). As an alternative,
I consider the average size of all the banks that were downgraded on that
particular date.11
Results for the Euro sample are provided in the appendix.12 Whenever a
downgrades occurs the larger the average size of the downgraded banks, the
greater the change in spreads. As before, this additional effect is statistically
significant using size dummies for 50% and 100%. Splitting downgrades
between investment and speculative leads to the same conclusions as with
the first definition for size.
It is clear that using a different way to compute size thresholds does not
change the major conclusions: downgrades on larger banks generate a wider
increase in sovereign spreads.
2.4.3 The financial situation of the country
An important factor in the analysis (particularly to assess if banks are deemed
as TBTS ) is whether the country under consideration is financially distressed.
I explicitly incorporate this into the regression analysis to assess whether
there is a differential reaction for troubled economies.
11I use a third alternative, i.e. the weighted average size. Results are qualitatively the
same as the simple mean, hence they are not tabulated.
12Analyzing the Full sample leads to the same conclusions.
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I include an additional dummy in the regression to account for two dif-
ferent set of countries: troubled economies (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal
and Spain - GIIPS), and sounder economies (Belgium, France, Netherlands,
Switzerland and UK). This dummy is interacted with the downgrade dummy
as stated in equation (2.5). Table 2.7 presents these results for the Euro sam-
ple.13
First, note that the downgrade and the speculative grade dummies are sig-
nificant regardless of the country. Analyzing the interaction terms between
the GIIPS variable and the dummy downgrades (column 1 ), leads to the con-
clusion that the effect on spreads is significantly larger for troubled economies
(1.84 additional bps). Then I separate downgrades between speculative and
investment (column 2 ). The additional effect for riskier downgrades in GI-
IPS is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the additional effect of
investment downgrades on GIIPS is statistically significant. This means that
riskier downgrades do not have an additional effect on troubled economies
(probably because the government is unable to completely insure the bank),
while the opposite holds for less risky downgrades.
The evidence supports the idea that downgrades on banks located on
distressed economies have a larger impact on sovereigns. This is consistent
with the claim that the risk transfer from banks to governments is larger in
troubled countries, supporting hypothesis H3.
Then, I include the previous systemic size thresholds in the analysis in
order to assess the effect of banks’ size in distressed economies. This is
presented in equation (2.6). According to the TBTS banks hypothesis, the
effect of downgrades on larger banks should be less important for troubled
economies since they are less likely to be able to bail out banks. Table 2.8
13Analyzing the Full sample does not qualitatively affect the main conclusions.
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presents the main results using the Euro sample.14
First, note that the effect of downgrades is significant regardless of the size
of the bank and the economy in which it is located (columns 1 to 4 ). Then
note that downgrades occurring on troubled countries imply a significant
incremental effect. This means that the risk transfer from banks to sovereigns
is larger when the economy is under severe distress (confirming the previous
result and further supporting hypothesis H3). Regarding banks size, it seems
that as we increase the size threshold under analysis (from 10% to 100% in
columns 1 to 4 ), the effect of downgrades becomes larger and ultimately
significant (for size 100%). These results are consistent with the idea that
banks are still deemed as TBTF, and any potential bailout would further
weaken countries’ financial situation. But note that the additional effect
of downgrades on large banks located in troubled economies is negative,
although is not statistically significant.
Finally I split downgrades between investment and speculative (columns
5 to 8 ). First of all note again, that the general effect of speculative down-
grades is significant regardless of the size and location of the bank. As in
the previous analysis (Table 2.7), the effect of downgrades on GIIPS is only
significant for investment grade downgrades. As we increase the size of the
downgraded bank, the effect becomes larger and significant for speculative
downgrades. Note that the coefficients for the 25%, 50% and 100% size in-
teractions (columns 6 to 8 ) are significant and economically important. For
instance, the additional effect of speculative downgrades on banks with sys-
temic size larger than 50% and 100% is 8.84 and 14 bps respectively (columns
7 and 8 ). Nevertheless, the additional effect for large banks that are located
in troubled economies is negative and significant. Particularly the additional
14The analysis of the Full sample leads to similar conclusions.
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effect of speculative downgrades on banks with size 50% and 100% in trou-
bled economies is -4.03 and -15.59 bps respectively. This means that riskier
downgrades on larger banks located in troubled economies are not as harmful
for sovereigns, i.e. the risk transfer is lower in these cases. This is consistent
with the idea that larger banks are regarded as TBTS, providing empiri-
cal support for hypothesis H4. It seems that riskier downgrades on larger
banks located in troubled economies do not imply a important risk transfer
to sovereigns. These banks are (at best) partially insured, since the public
sector is financially distressed.
2.4.4 Cross sectional analysis
I conclude the main analysis with the cross sectional study that is common
across event studies. I estimate the abnormal change on spreads for each
individual downgrade. For this procedure I re-estimate equation (2.1), but
using one dummy per downgrade. The estimation is done using day fixed
effects. The individual reactions for each downgrade generates a vector with
253 elements, that represents the new dependent variable in the cross section
analysis. Then I proceed with the estimation of the coefficients as presented
above in equation (2.7). Table 2.9 presents the results for the univariate
analysis in column (1) and the multivariate analysis in columns (2) and (3).
I will focus on three main findings here. First, note that the coefficient
for size is positive and statistically significant. This is a clear indication
that downgrades on larger banks generate a significantly larger reaction on
sovereign spreads. This is consistent with the TBTF hypothesis. Addition-
ally, note that the coefficient for the systemic size is negative and significant
as well. This reaction is consistent with the TBTS idea, i.e. downgrades
on systemically larger banks would imply a lower effect on sovereigns since
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the implicit insurance for these banks is lower. Finally the coefficient for the
TMTF is negative and significant (both alternatives). This means that there
is no evidence that multiple downgrades on relatively smaller banks generate
a deeper risk transfer to sovereigns.
This cross section analysis provides evidence consistent with a risk trans-
fer from banks to sovereigns due to government guarantees. Larger banks,
that are implicitly insured (TBTF ) imply a higher transfer, since the guaran-
tees to these banks are larger. But if these banks become systemically large,
they are deemed as TBTS and part of this implicit insurance is lost. Then,
risk transfer in these cases is lower.
2.4.5 Additional analyses
The period under consideration suffers from large volatility since it covers the
last financial crisis (this is one of the reasons for the low adjusted R-squared in
all previous analysis). In order to prevent spurious inferences due to extreme
outliers, I winsorize the data on the change of spreads at a 1% (for each tail).
Given the nature of the experiment conducted, some extreme values might
be caused by the events under analysis. For this reason, as an additional
approach, I winsorize only values in non-event days (or surrounding dates).
Since results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, I only report the
results for the first approach in the appendix.
When winsorizing data, all previous results and conclusions regarding
the hypotheses analyzed are almost unchanged. The coefficients for event
dummies and interactions (when considering size) as well as the correspond-
ing significance levels, are in general slightly lower compared to the original
analysis. But the magnitudes are not substantially different in statistical nor
economic terms.
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In order to assess the strength of the results regarding the risk transfer
I repeat the analysis from equations (2.1) and (2.2) using day fixed effects.
This allows me to capture changes in macroeconomic fundamentals and other
unobserved shocks that might be affecting sovereign spreads (Acharya et al.,
2014). Results for general downgrades and separating speculative from in-
vestment grade downgrades are tabulated in the appendix (using the Full and
Euro samples). Using this approach the significance for all the coefficients is
lower (as expected). Nevertheless, speculative downgrades still imply a sig-
nificant increase in sovereign spreads, enhancing the validity of all previous
conclusions. There is indeed an important risk transfer from the financial
sector to sovereigns.
Finally, I include an additional variable into the analysis that captures
the common movement within each country. The reason is to capture unob-
served elements that might be driving both the changes in sovereign spreads
as well as the decisions to downgrade banks. For this purpose I use the cor-
responding stock market benchmark index for each country under analysis.
This is included throughout all the equations used, leading to quantitative
and qualitatively similar results. Some of these results are tabulated in the
appendix (using only the Euro sample). 15 These results strengthen the
conclusions regarding bailout expectations and implicit insurance.
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper I use the event study methodology to analyze the relation-
ship between downgrades on banks financial strength ratings and sovereign
spreads. This analysis allows me to estimate and quantify the shift of risk
15The rest of the tables are available upon request.
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from banks to governments. One of the main advantages of this methodol-
ogy lies on the simplicity to interpret the results, while allowing to reduce
endogeneity issues caused by reverse causality.
A priori, we would expect that riskier banking systems are related to
higher sovereign spreads due to government guarantees. Results confirm this
premise: increasing banks’ risk (proxied by BFSR downgrades) translates
into higher sovereign spreads. The evidence in this paper suggests that this
risk transfer is mainly due to bailout expectations on banks, consistent with
the findings by Leonello (2015), Acharya et al. (2014) and Dieckmann and
Plank (2012). Distinguishing these events between downgrades within in-
vestment and speculative grades strengthens this explanation. Banks with
a speculative grade are deemed as riskier, i.e. closer to default. In this
context these type of downgrades generate a significantly larger reaction on
sovereigns. This means that the risk transfer to sovereign spreads is partic-
ularly acute for riskier banks.
Then I introduce banks’ systemic size into the analysis to test whether
larger banks generate a wider effect. If large banks are deemed as TBTF,
a larger effect on spreads would be consistent with a risk transfer due to
government guarantees (bailout expectations). Results suggest that in gen-
eral, downgrades on larger banks generate a significantly larger increase in
sovereign spreads. This result supports the claim that larger banks are still
regarded as TBTF. Additionally, this result is consistent with the idea that
the risk transfer occurs because of the existence of government guarantees.
Differentiating whether the downgrade occur in a troubled economy, I find
evidence consistent with the idea that some banks are regarded as TBTS.
Riskier downgrades on larger banks located in distressed economies generate
a significantly lower reaction (as compared to downgrades on large banks
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located in more stable economies). The implicit insurance dilutes as govern-
ments are financially distressed, reducing the corresponding risk transfer.
Finally, I analyzed the cross section for the abnormal changes in spreads.
This test confirmed previous results, i.e. larger banks generate a wider in-
crease in spreads (TBTF ), but there is evidence of TBTS situations as well.
These results and conclusions are robust to a set of additional tests and
the use of different variables. The set of events chosen might have been (at
least partially) anticipated by the market, i.e. the change in ratings for banks
might be expected by the market. This means that the reaction I capture is
actually a noisy signal of the event. Despite this additional noise the reaction
I find is significant, strengthening the conclusions.
The contributions of paper are multiple. First, it complements in a novel
way previous research regarding the link between the financial system and
sovereigns’ default risk, particularly the transfer from banks to sovereigns.
The study provides additional empirical support for previous theoretical
frameworks. Additionally, to the extent of my knowledge, this is the first
paper to explicitly document the relationship between banks’ downgrades
and sovereign spreads. It also provides evidence on the use of ratings by the
market to assess risk. The paper also allows to explicitly test if larger banks
are still implicitly insured and whether some of them have become TBTS.
Since the evidence presented suggests that there is a risk transfer arising
due to government guarantees, regulators should try to solve the usual moral
hazard problem in order to reduce bailout expectations. Bail-in policies or
reforming resolution regimes for large banks are some possible alternatives.
Forcing banks to reduce their size may be tempting for distressed economies,
and might help to reduce the potential risk transfer issue. Nevertheless it
might not be the optimal way to deal with this problem since it will not
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take care of the distorted incentives in the banking sector. On the other
hand, if bailout expectations are credibly reduced market discipline would
be a more effective regulatory tool reducing bank risk-taking. In this case
the corresponding risk transfer from banks to governments would be reduced
as well. This would be true for two reasons: banks would be safer (there
is less need for a bailout), and governments would be able to make credible
commitments not to further bail out banks.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Days with events by country
Market Downgrades Speculative 1 Speculative 2 Speculative 3
Belgium 13 4 4 4
France 32 14 16 15
Greece 9 6 7 6
Ireland 29 16 16 13
Italy 62 42 45 38
Netherlands 15 6 6 6
Portugal 16 14 15 11
Spain 27 13 14 13
Switzerland 15 0 0 0
UK 35 12 14 11
Total 253 127 137 117
Note: Speculative 1, 2 and 3 are defined according to the largest bank rating on that
day, the mean rating, and the weighted average rating, respectively.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics - Grades & Notches
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Grade 476 8.75 2.48 2 1 3
Notches 476 1.53 0.85 1 6
Note: The mean grade lies between C − /D+, i.e. within investment grades.
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Table 2.4: The effect of downgrades on sovereign spreads: Linear relationship
with size
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Spreadt 0.0993*** 0.1001*** 0.0993*** 0.1001***
Downgrade 0.0143* 0.0188** - -
Down. x Size 0.0091* 0.0131 - -
Investment - - 0.0052 0.0083
Speculative - - 0.0233** 0.0269**
Spec. x Size - - 0.0389 0.04
Invest. x Size - - 0.0045* 0.0037
Constant 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
N 23450 18760 23450 18760
AdjR2 0.0107 0.0111 0.0106 0.011
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Note: Columns (2) and (4) include only Euro countries. Dependent variable is the
change in sovereign spreads after the downgrade takes place. Downgrade is a dummy
that equals 1 there is a downgrade on the corresponding, and zero otherwise. Similarly
Investment (Speculative) is a dummy that equals 1 if the final rating of the downgraded
bank is above (below or equal) D+ and zero otherwise. Size is the systemic size of the bank
as measured by the ratio of its total liabilities to its home country GDP. All regressions
are using country and year fixed effects.
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Table 2.7: The effect of downgrades on sovereign spreads: GIIPS
Variable (1) (2)
∆Spreadt 0.1001*** 0.1001***
Downgrade 0.0061* -
Down. x GIIPS 0.0184* -
Investment - -0.0025
Speculative - 0.0189*
Spec. x GIIPS - 0.0102
Inv. x GIIPS - 0.0188***
Constant 0.0002 0.0002
N 18760 18760
AdjR2 0.0111 0.011
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Note: Regressions include only Euro countries. Dependent variable is the change in
sovereign spreads after the downgrade takes place. Downgrade is a dummy that equals
1 there is a downgrade on the corresponding, and zero otherwise. Similarly Investment
(Speculative) is a dummy that equals 1 if the final rating of the downgraded bank is above
(below or equal) D+ and zero otherwise. GIIPS is a dummy that takes value 1 if the home
country of the bank is a distressed economy (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain), or
zero otherwise. All regressions are using country and year fixed effects.
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Table 2.9: The effect of downgrades on sovereign spreads: Cross section
analysis
Variable (AR) (1) (2) (3)
Size 0.0006** 0.0113*** 0.0104**
Systemic size 0.0131*** -0.0217* -0.0207*
Equity ratio 0.0009* 0.0015 0.0013
ROAA -0.0059 -0.0054 -0.0054
Liquidity ratio 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
TMTF 0.0027 -0.0283** -
TMTFalt -0.0166** - -0.0289**
Notches 0.0104** 0.0089 0.0083
Speculative 0.0158** 0.0161 0.0153
N 234 234 234
AdjR2 - 0.1070 0.1035
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Note: Dependent variable is the abnormal change in sovereign spreads after the down-
grade takes place (estimated using day and country fixed effects). Size is the natural
logarithm of banks’ total assets and Systemic size is the ratio between banks’ total liabili-
ties to country’s GDP. Equity ratio is the equity to total assets ratio, ROAA is the return
on average assets (average between year t and t−1) and Liquidity ratio is the liquid assets
to deposits and short-term fundings ratio. TMTF is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
more than one downgrade takes place (on that day) and none of the downgraded banks is
large (systemic size 50%), and zero otherwise. TMTFalt is a dummy variable that equals
1 if more than one downgrade takes place (on that day) and the sum of all downgraded
banks’ systemic size is lower than 50%, and zero otherwise. Notches corresponds to the
number of downgraded notches, while Speculative is a dummy that equals 1 if the final
grade of the downgraded bank is lower or equal than D+. Column (1) corresponds to the
univariate analysis, while column (2) and (3) are multivariate analyses using country and
year fixed effects.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Irish vs Icelandic CDS spreads
Note: Daily CDS spreads for Ireland and Iceland. Computed using 5-year contracts.
Measured in basis points. On 30-09-2008 Ireland announced that deposits of all major
banks were guaranteed (bailout line). On 06-10-2008 Iceland let major banks fail.
Finally, on 08-03-2010 in the Iceland referendum to determine (among other things)
whether to pay to foreign depositors (from UK and Netherlands), the “NO” won with
98%.
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Figure 2.2: Spreads by Country
Note: Daily sovereign bond spread. Computed using 10-year bonds, and spreads over
German bonds. Measured in percentage points. Sample period (horizontal axes) starts in
January 2005, and finishes in December 2014.
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Figure 2.3: Change in spreads - All downgrades - Mean effect
(a) Full sample
(b) Euro sample
Note: Change in spreads (measured in percentage points) around the event date,
computed using all downgrades in the sample. Average effect across countries. Day t = 0
corresponds to the downgrade date.
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Figure 2.4: Change in spreads - Speculative downgrades - Mean effect
(a) Full sample
(b) Euro sample
Note: Change in spreads (measured in percentage points) around the event date,
computed using only speculative downgrades in the sample. Average effect across
countries. Day t = 0 corresponds to the downgrade date.
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Appendix A: Bank Financial Strength Rating
The BFRS is not a credit rating itself, but an assessment of “each bank’s
intrinsic, or standalone” strength. 16 Since it reflects the probability of
default, it is related to the possibility of needing external support either by
its owners or other official institution. It is an input to get the final rating
of the banks.
The BFRS (that is based on 13 possible ratings from A to E) translates
into a Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA):
BFSR to BCA conversion
BFSR BCA Grade (if final rating)
A aaa Investment
A- aa1 Investment
B+ aa2 Investment
B aa3 Investment
B- a1 Investment
C+ a2 Investment
C a3 Investment
C- baa1 Investment
C- baa2 Investment
D+ baa3 Investment
D+ ba1 Speculative
D ba2 Speculative
D- ba3 Speculative
E+ b1 Speculative
E+ b2 Speculative
E+ b3 Speculative
E caa1 Speculative
E caa2 Speculative
E caa3 Speculative
Then taking into consideration external support factors (parent, local or
national governments) or country ceilings, the final senior debt and deposit
16In order to obtain the set of BFRS downgrades, I used Moody’s web page search
module with the following parameters: ‘Financial Institutions; Banking; Banks; Bank’.
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rating is obtained.
To obtain the BFRS, Moody’s consider 5 different intrinsic key factors.
Using scorecards they evaluate each of the factors (and sub-factors), and
assign scores that will translate into the final grade depending on the weight
of each factor.
• Franchise Value: Market share and sustainability, geographical diver-
sification, earnings stability and diversification.
• Risk positioning: Corporate governance, controls and risk manage-
ment, financial reporting transparency, credit risk concentration, liq-
uidity management, and market risk appetite.
• Regulatory Environment: Independence (of regulator), regulatory stan-
dards, supervision, enforcement, maturity of regulatory framework, and
health of banking system.
• Operating Environment: Economic stability, integrity and corruption,
and legal system. 17
• Financial Fundamentals: Profitability, liquidity, capital adequacy, effi-
ciency, and asset quality.
The first four are qualitative factors. The weights of each factor (finan-
cial fundamentals and qualitative component) will depend on the country in
which the bank is located: whether it is a mature or a developing market.
Moody’s determines this using each country ceilings for sovereign bonds. 18
Those countries with a ceiling Aa1 or greater are considered mature markets.
Given the sample of countries, Greece loses its Aaa ceiling on June, 1st 2012
17The economic stability is measured using the standard deviation of GDP growth.
18Country ceilings should not be confused with government’s credit ratings.
100
becoming Caa2. Ireland did so on September, 6th 2012 with a A3 ceiling.
Italy loses its Aaa category and becomes A2 on July, 13th 2012. Portugal was
downgraded on September, 5th 2012 becoming Baa3. Finally Spain suffered
a ceiling downgrade on June, 13th 2012 and becomes A3. This means that
throughout almost all sample time period all the countries under analysis are
categorized as mature markets.
On mature markets both qualitative and financial fundamentals are equally
weighted. On developing markets, qualitative factors represent 70% of the
final score, while financial fundamentals stand for the remaining 30%. Ad-
ditionally for mature markets franchise value and risk positioning represent
40% of the final qualitative score, while the operating and regulatory en-
vironment, represent only 10%. On the other hand in developing markets,
franchise value represents 10% of the final qualitative score, while each of the
remaining factors (risk positioning, regulatory and operating environment)
represent 30% of the qualitative score.
Giving the nature of the analysis (the effect of downgrades in BFRS on
sovereign bonds) one might be worried about reverse causality. For example a
poor macroeconomic environment, might lead sovereign yields up, and bank
ratings down. But given the low weights of these factors on the BFRS, this is
a relatively unimportant factor (economic stability represents 7% of the final
score in developing markets, and only 1.7% for mature markets). Similar
situation applies when there is a downgrade on sovereign. The effect should
be captured by the ‘operating environment’ factor, but the weight assigned
to it might not be enough to lead the rating down.
On March 17th, 2015 Moody’s announced that for business reasons, the
BFSRs were withdrawn as inputs to ratings. From that moment onwards
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only the BCA would indicate standalone ratings. 19
Appendix B: Sovereign bond data
The information regarding sovereigns was obtained from Datastream using
the following codes.
Datastream codes for Sovereigns
Name Code
BELGIUM BENCHMARK BOND 10 YR (DS) - RED. YIELD BGBRYLD
FRANCE BENCHMARK BOND 10 YR (DS) - RED. YIELD FRBRYLD
GREECE BENCHMARK BOND 10 YR (DS) - RED. YIELD GRBRYLD
IRELAND BENCHMARK BOND 10 YR (DS) - RED. YIELD IRBRYLD
ITALY BENCHMARK BOND 10 YR (DS) - RED. YIELD ITBRYLD
NETHERLANDS BENCHMARK BOND 10 YR (DS) - RED. YIELD NLBRYLD
PORTUGAL BENCHMARK BOND 10 YR (DS) - RED. YIELD PTBRYLD
SPAIN BENCHMARK BOND 10 YR (DS) - RED. YIELD ESBRYLD
UK BENCHMARK BOND 10 YR (DS) - RED. YIELD UKMBRYD
SWITZERLAND BNCHMRK. BOND 10 YR (DS) - RED. YIELD SWBRYLD
GERMANY BENCHMARK BOND 10 YR (DS) - RED. YIELD BDBRYLD
These series are copied from the previous “Benchmark 10 Year DS Govt.”
(e.g. for Belgium the alternative code would be: BMBG10Y). These series
are based on single underlying bond which have 10 year life. This bond
is the most representative available for the corresponding maturity, at that
period of time. In general these benchmarks are the latest issue within the
maturity band. Datastream reviews daily new bonds for the selection of
the benchmark, and at the beginning of each month changes are made (if
needed).
19See https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-reviews-global-bank-ratings--PR_
321005.
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Appendix C: Unit-Root test for yields and spreads
In order to complement the plots for the spreads for each individual country,
I present the Levin-Lin-Chu test to evaluate whether spreads (and the change
in daily spreads) have unit-roots. The null hypothesis is the presence of a
unit-root in the series.
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for spread
Ho: Panels contain unit roots Number of panels = 10
Ha: Panels are stationary Number of periods = 2347
Statistic p-value
Unadjusted t -6.024
Adjusted t* 0.1922 0.5762
Note:
Estimated using 0 lags and a time trend.
It seems clear that there process is not stationary. The I estimate the
differences in spreads and performed the same test.
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for the change in spreads
Ho: Panels contain unit roots Number of panels = 10
Ha: Panels are stationary Number of periods = 2346
Statistic p-value
Unadjusted t −1.40E + 02
Adjusted t* −2.40E + 02 0
Note:
Estimated using 0 lags and a time trend.
There is no doubt, when analyzing the changes in spreads, that the series
is stationary.
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Appendix D: Additional summary statistics and
tables
Table 2.10: Summary statistics - Daily change in spreads
Market N Mean Std.Dev Min Max
∆Spread (%) - Overall 23460 0.0008 0.2164 -27.446 7.03
∆Spread (%) - Belgium 2,346 0.00026 0.04205 -0.29300 0.32400
∆Spread (%) - France 2,346 0.00027 0.02826 -0.28700 0.27200
∆Spread (%) - Greece 2,346 0.00274 0.65277 -27.44600 7.03000
∆Spread (%) - Ireland 2,346 0.00073 0.09114 -1.21270 0.82300
∆Spread (%) - Italy 2,346 0.00087 0.07479 -0.77500 0.59500
∆Spread (%) - Netherlands 2,346 0.00013 0.01790 -0.12300 0.15300
∆Spread (%) - Portugal 2,346 0.00182 0.13170 -1.65460 1.75900
∆Spread (%) - Spain 2,346 0.00093 0.07469 -0.81800 0.43000
∆Spread (%) - Switzerland 2,346 0.00024 0.03839 -0.25220 0.17200
∆Spread (%) - UK 2,346 0.00006 0.03235 -0.23690 0.23620
Table 2.11: Downgrades by country-year
Market \ Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Belgium 4 4 3 - 3 3 - 17
France 13 4 10 2 7 13 3 52
Greece - - 9 11 11 - - 31
Ireland 6 5 19 4 1 7 4 46
Italy 21 5 18 6 9 32 19 110
Netherlands 4 1 6 3 2 3 1 20
Portugal 6 3 9 3 10 8 1 40
Spain 15 9 24 - 3 29 8 88
Switzerland 5 4 1 - 2 6 2 20
UK 11 7 21 1 - 8 4 52
Total 85 42 120 30 48 109 42 476
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Table 2.12: Summary - Downgrades characteristics by country
Market Grade Notches
Mean SD Mean SD
Belgium 7.235 1.855 1.235 0.562
France 8.115 2.211 1.423 0.977
Greece 10.742 2.016 1.419 0.564
Ireland 9.022 2.736 1.717 1.047
Italy 9.427 1.960 1.464 0.738
Netherlands 7.700 2.618 1.400 0.821
Portugal 9.850 2.143 1.400 0.672
Spain 8.875 2.453 1.761 0.935
Switzerland 6.450 1.538 1.400 0.754
UK 7.269 2.521 1.615 0.932
Total 8.752 2.476 1.534 0.852
Table 2.13: Number of (different) downgraded banks by country
Market Number
Belgium 4
France 18
Greece 9
Ireland 15
Italy 47
Netherlands 9
Portugal 10
Spain 39
Switzerland 11
UK 18
Total 180
Table 2.14: Number of banks by specialization
Specialization Number
Commercial, coop. and saving 148
Investment and private 13
Real estate and gov. credit inst. 10
Finance companies 6
Bank holding companies 3
Total 180
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Table 2.15: Characteristics of downgraded banks: by country
Market Log(TotAssets) Sys. Size Equity
TotAssets
ROAA Liq.Asset
Dep&STFund
Belgium 20.03 1.11 3.59 -0.57 28.41
France 19.70 0.29 4.24 0.25 68.07
Greece 17.73 0.23 5.15 -3.67 10.93
Ireland 18.12 0.52 6.38 -1.40 31.67
Italy 17.33 0.06 6.74 -0.28 22.93
Netherlands 19.03 0.61 4.14 0.05 38.65
Portugal 17.86 0.32 2.43 -0.60 17.92
Spain 17.86 0.12 5.77 -0.65 17.89
Switzerland 17.99 0.88 7.22 0.42 55.64
UK 18.98 0.25 5.90 -0.26 66.24
Total 18.23 0.29 5.47 -0.59 34.08
Table 2.16: CAR for alternative event windows
(1) (2)
CAR P-value CAR P-value
[t-1,t+1] - Investment 0.0048 0.6919 0.0176 0.1523
[t-1,t+1] - Speculative 0.0364 0.0408 0.0436 0.0226
[t-3,t+3] - Investment 0.0011 0.9469 0.0085 0.6437
[t-3,t+3] - Speculative 0.0438 0.211 0.054 0.1754
Note: These CAR are estimated using equation (2.2) with country and year fixed effects.
Column (2) does not include UK nor Switzerland.
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Table 2.17: Speculative 2nd definition
Variable (1) (2)
∆Spreadt 0.0993*** 0.1001***
Investment 0.0051 0.0082
Speculative 0.0223** 0.0260**
Constant 0.0001 0.0002
N 23450 18760
AdjR2 0.0107 0.0111
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Note: Dependent variable is the change in sovereign spreads after the downgrade
takes place. Investment (Speculative) is a dummy that equals 1 if the final rating of the
downgraded bank is above (below or equal) D+ and zero otherwise. For this I use the
second definition for Speculative, i.e. mean rating of downgraded banks on a given day.
All regressions are using country and year fixed effects. Regression (2) does not include
UK nor Switzerland.
Table 2.18: Speculative 3rd definition
Variable (1) (2)
∆Spreadt 0.0993*** 0.1001***
Investment 0.0038 0.006
Speculative 0.0268** 0.0309**
Constant 0.0001 0.0002
N 23450 18760
AdjR2 0.0107 0.0111
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Note: Dependent variable is the change in sovereign spreads after the downgrade
takes place. Investment (Speculative) is a dummy that equals 1 if the final rating of
the downgraded bank is above (below or equal) D+ and zero otherwise. For this I use
the second definition for Speculative, i.e. weighted average rating of downgraded. All
regressions are using country and year fixed effects. Regression (2) does not include UK
nor Switzerland.
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Table 2.19: Alternative size threshold - Non linear relationship w/ size - Euro
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Spreadt 0.1001*** 0.1001*** 0.1001*** 0.1001***
Downgrade 0.0188** 0.0189** 0.0189** 0.0189**
Down. x Size-10% 0.0074 - - -
Down. x Size-25% - 0.0054 - -
Down. x Size-50% - - 0.0231** -
Down. x Size-100% - - - 0.0239***
Constant 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
N 18760 18760 18760 18760
AdjR2 0.0111 0.0111 0.0111 0.0111
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Note: Regression do not include UK nor Switzerland. Dependent variable is the change
in sovereign spreads after the downgrade takes place. Downgrade is a dummy that equals
1 there is a downgrade on the corresponding, and zero otherwise. Size-X% is a dummy
that equals 1 if the systemic size of the bank (measured by the ratio of its total liabilities
to its home country GDP) is above X%, or zero otherwise. For downgrades of multiple
banks, the average systemic size of all downgraded banks is used. All regressions are using
country and year fixed effects.
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Table 2.20: Alternative size threshold - Non linear relationship w/ size - Euro
- Investment vs Speculative downgrades
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Spreadt 0.1001*** 0.1001*** 0.1001*** 0.1001***
Investment 0.0059 0.0059 0.006 0.0059
Speculative 0.0308** 0.0307** 0.0309** 0.0309**
Spec. x Size-10% 0.0215 - - -
Inv. x Size-10% -0.0045 - - -
Spec. x Size-25% - 0.0226 - -
Inv. x Size-25% - -0.0054 - -
Spec. x Size-50% - - 0.0585*** -
Inv. x Size-50% - - 0.0057 -
Spec. x Size-100% - - - 0.0581
Inv. x Size-100% - - - 0.0114
Constant 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
N 18760 18760 18760 18760
AdjR2 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Note: Regression do not include UK nor Switzerland. Dependent variable is the
change in sovereign spreads after the downgrade takes place. Investment (Speculative)
is a dummy that equals 1 if the final rating of the downgraded bank is above (below or
equal) D+ and zero otherwise. Size-X% is a dummy that equals 1 if the systemic size of
the bank (measured by the ratio of its total liabilities to its home country GDP) is above
X%, or zero otherwise. For downgrades of multiple banks, the average systemic size of all
downgraded banks is used. All regressions are using country and year fixed effects.
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Table 2.21: Winsorizing - General analysis
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Spreadt 0.2610*** 0.2710*** 0.2610*** 0.2710***
Downgrade 0.0110* 0.0138* - -
Investment - - 0.0031 0.0049
Speculative - - 0.0189* 0.0207*
Constant 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
N 23450 18760 23450 18760
AdjR2 0.0723 0.079 0.0723 0.079
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Note: Even columns include only Euro countries. Dependent variable is the change
in sovereign spreads after the downgrade takes place. Downgrade is a dummy that equals
1 there is a downgrade on the corresponding, and zero otherwise. Similarly Investment
(Speculative) is a dummy that equals 1 if the final rating of the downgraded bank is
above (below or equal) D+ and zero otherwise. Windsorization at 1%, for maximum and
minimum values for the change in spreads. All regressions are using country and year
fixed effects.
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Table 2.22: Winsorizing - Non linear relationship w/ size - Euro - Speculative
downgrades
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Spreadt 0.2711*** 0.2711*** 0.2710*** 0.2710***
Investment 0.0048 0.0048 0.0049 0.0048
Speculative 0.0206* 0.0205* 0.0207* 0.0207*
Spec. x Size-10% 0.0135 - - -
Inv. x Size-10% -0.0025 - - -
Spec. x Size-25% - 0.0173 - -
Inv. x Size-25% - -0.0045 - -
Spec. x Size-50% - - 0.0466*** -
Inv. x Size-50% - - 0.0034 -
Spec. x Size-100% - - - 0.0101
Inv. x Size-100% - - - 0.0088
Constant 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
N 18760 18760 18760 18760
AdjR2 0.0789 0.0789 0.0791 0.0789
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Note: Regressions include only Euro countries. Dependent variable is the change in
sovereign spreads after the downgrade takes place. Investment (Speculative) is a dummy
that equals 1 if the final rating of the downgraded bank is above (below or equal) D+
and zero otherwise. Size-X% is a dummy that equals 1 if the systemic size of the bank
(measured by the ratio of its total liabilities to its home country GDP) is above X%, or
zero otherwise. Windsorization at 1%, for maximum and minimum values for the change
in spreads. All regressions are using country and year fixed effects.
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Table 2.23: Using day fixed effects - General analysis
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Spreadt 0.0919*** 0.0901*** 0.0919*** 0.0901***
Downgrade 0.0223 0.0352 - -
Investment - - 0.0302 0.0549
Speculative - - 0.0145* 0.0201**
Constant 0.0017 -0.0022** 0.0017 -0.0022**
N 23450 18760 23450 18760
AdjR2 0.0477 0.0547 0.0477 0.0547
Legend: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
Note: Even columns include only Euro countries. Dependent variable is the change
in sovereign spreads after the downgrade takes place. Downgrade is a dummy that equals
1 there is a downgrade on the corresponding, and zero otherwise. Similarly Investment
(Speculative) is a dummy that equals 1 if the final rating of the downgraded bank is above
(below or equal) D+ and zero otherwise. All regressions are using country and day fixed
effects.
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Chapter 3
Risk-taking and optimal joint
liquidity and capital
requirements
3.1 Introduction
Before the last financial crisis, regulators had a highly developed system to
regulate capital requirements (Repullo, 2004). Nevertheless, there was no
formal standard regulating liquidity (Stein, 2013), and the Lender of Last
Resort was the main tool to manage banks’ liquidity problems (Repullo,
2005). The financial crisis exposed this gap on the regulatory framework,
exposing its weaknesses. There has been an important change in the regula-
tory focus since. Regulation on liquidity standards have become one of the
main targets for banks’ supervisors (e.g. Basel III).1
In general, liquidity and capital have been analyzed in isolation. The
former is used to reduce liquidity risk, while the latter to prevent solvency
risk. Nevertheless, these tools are not independent (Vives, 2014; Walther,
2015). For instance, requirements on liquid assets will have an effect on
1The Basel Committee proposed the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable
Funding Ratio (NSFR), while the British FSA released a set of guidances to regulate banks’
liquidity (similar to Basel’s LCR).
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banks’ risk choice as well. There is an underlying relationship between capital
and liquidity requirements, which will shape the optimal regulation. The aim
of this paper is to characterize this relationship between capital and liquidity,
i.e. whether these are complements or substitutes.
For this purpose, we construct a theoretical model with a bank that in-
vests in a risky asset, and determines endogenously solvency risk (through
monitoring). Additionally, this bank is subject to an exogenous level of early
deposit withdrawals, generating liquidity risk. Liquid reserves are used to
survive early withdrawals. But liquidity generates a trade-off. On the one
hand, increasing liquid assets monotonically reduces liquidity risk. On the
other hand, it reduces the share invested in the profitable project. By the
same token, this duality of liquidity will affect bank’s incentives to monitor.
When liquid assets are low, liquidity risk is high and bank’s future expected
value is low, since the likelihood of failing due to deposit withdrawals is high.
Hence, monitoring will be low. As we increase liquidity, bank’s future expected
value increases (via a reduction in liquidity risk), and so does the incentives
to monitor. But with high monitoring, the opportunity cost of liquidity in-
creases, since each additional unit of liquid funds will imply a reduction in the
future value of the investment project. Then, further increasing liquidity will
decrease bank’s incentives to monitor (given the reduction in the investment
project).
Using these mechanisms, we analyze the decisions of a regulator that
sets both capital and liquidity requirements in order to enhance social wel-
fare. Capital induces monitoring (via skin in the game) reducing solvency
risk, while liquidity reduces the risk of failing due to deposit withdrawals
reducing liquidity risk. Solvency and liquidity risk are independent in the
model. Nevertheless, not only we find that the optimal capital and liquidity
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requirements are interrelated, but they can be complements or substitutes.
The degree of complementarity (or substitutability) between these regulatory
tools will ultimately depend on the shadow cost of capital.
If capital is inexpensive, the regulator will set a relatively large capital
requirement. Then, the bank will have more incentives to monitor (due to
the skin in the game effect), increasing both bank’s future expected value as
well as the opportunity cost of using liquidity. Further increases on capital
will be coupled with reductions on liquidity requirements, since holding liquid
assets will be too expensive (in terms of forgone investment). This means
that capital and liquidity are substitutes. On the other hand, if capital
is expensive, the regulator will set a low capital requirement and bank’s
monitoring will be relatively lower. Additionally, bank’s future expected value
will be low, just like the opportunity cost of liquidity. Then, increasing capital
will be accompanied with increases in liquidity requirements, in order to
enhance the probability of surviving early withdrawals (given that liquidity
is relatively cheap). This means that capital and liquidity requirements are
complements.
The model has several important regulatory implications. Regulators
trying to enhance financial stability by setting liquidity requirements, might
shift bank’s incentives towards riskier portfolios. Additionally, a regulator
that set independently too stringent capital and liquidity requirements, might
reduce social welfare. Then, regulators should recognize the existence of
the aforementioned interactions between capital and liquidity requirements,
when they maximize social welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews some of
the previous literature on capital and liquidity. Section 3.3 briefly presents
the general setting, bank’s maximization problem, and the regulator’s opti-
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mal capital and liquidity policy. Section 3.4 presents possible extensions for
the basic model. Finally, section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Related literature
Repullo (2004) presents a model where the risk-based capital requirement is
a useful way to prevent banks from investing in a gambling asset. Hence, the
capital requirement is an efficient tool to reduce solvency risk. On a similar
line, Repullo (2005) analyzes the effect of a Lender of Last Resort on moral
hazard, and finds that it is capital requirement (and not liquidity) what ul-
timately shapes banks’ risk profile. Then, the existence of a Lender of Last
Resort will have no impact on banks’ risk-taking. Similarly, Freixas et al.
(2011) find that a central bank might improve liquidity redistribution by us-
ing interest rates. Particularly, in an environment with high uncertainty (e.g.
crisis period), a reduction on interest rates will improve the reallocation of
liquidity between banks, enhancing financial stability. On a different paper,
Calomiris et al. (2015) analyze the use of liquidity requirements, and find
that cash reserves (together with deposit insurance) are useful to induce a
proper risk management. In this setting liquidity acts as a self-commitment
device to monitor investments. Our study contributes to these papers, by fo-
cusing on the joint use of liquidity and capital requirements, and their effect
on banks’ behavior.
On a related paper, De Nicolo´ et al. (2014) analyze the use of capital
and liquidity using a dynamic model. They argue that these regulatory
tools are substitutes: while capital has a hump-shaped relationship with
social welfare, liquidity unambiguously reduces lending and welfare. On a
recent contribution, Vives (2014) uses the idea of strategic complementarity
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(between investors’ decisions) to analyze capital and liquidity requirements.
In this environment, these are substitutes, at least partially, since they are
used to solve different problems (solvency and liquidity). Additionally, the
author finds that liquidity requirements become more important if there is
more disclosure on banks’ assets. Finally, Walther (2015) analyze the effects
of macro-prudential (e.g. liquidity) and micro-prudential regulation (e.g.
capital). The author finds that using only one of these tools would exacerbate
the severity of the optimal measure, arguing that capital and liquidity are
imperfect substitutes. Our model complements this stream of literature by
analyzing a different mechanism in which liquidity affects banks’ decisions:
it reduces liquidity risk, but decreases the share of long term investments.
Using this approach, we allow for a complementarity effect between capital
and liquidity requirements (as opposed to previous literature). The final
direction of this relationship between the regulatory tools, will depend on
the shadow cost of capital.
3.3 The model: General setting
We model a three-periods economy, t ∈ {0, 1, 2}, where all agents are risk
neutral and there is a zero discount factor. In this economy, there is a unique
bank that can invest in a profitable project (loan) or a liquid asset. To do
this, the bank uses three different sources of funds: deposits, other debt (e.g.
bonds) and capital.
The investment opportunity is a long term project that requires one unit
of funds at t = 0, and returns M > 1 at t = 2 when it is successful. Bank’s
monitoring effort θ ∈ [0, 1] will determine the success probability of the
project. Then, (1 − θ) represents bank’s solvency risk. Nevertheless, moni-
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toring effort is costly for the bank. Following DellAriccia and Marquez (2006)
and Allen et al. (2011b), we model this cost as a quadratic function c
2
θ2.
Demand deposits (d) are one of the sources of funds for the bank. These
are assumed to be limited to a fixed amount. Deposits can be withdrawn
at any moment, and are completely insured by a deposit insurance scheme,
allowing us to normalize interest rates to one.2 Then, depositors have no
incentives to monitor the bank at any stage in the model, nor to withdraw
early (unless they have liquidity needs).
Similar to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), some depositors will have liquid-
ity needs at an intermediate period t = 1. But in this model, the amount
β ∈ [0, d] of early withdrawals is unknown beforehand. Nevertheless, it fol-
lows a known distribution function with cdf F (β). We do not restrict this
probability to a particular function, but only assume that it is log-concave,
continuous and differentiable. If the bank is unable to satisfy depositors’
withdrawals, it is liquidated at period t = 0.3
In order to prevent bankruptcy due to early withdrawals, the bank con-
stitutes liquidity reserves. But this has a downside, since it reduces the
resources available to investment in the long term project. The bank allo-
cates a magnitude λ to cash reserves, while the remaining 1 − λ is invested
in the long term project. Whenever liquidity reserves are less than deposit
withdrawals (β > d), the bank is liquidated at t = 1 and makes zero profit.
Hence, F (λ) represents the likelihood of surviving deposit withdrawals at
t = 0 (survival probability), and 1− F (λ) is the liquidity risk.
Since the bank needs to invest one unit of funds and uses d deposits, the
remaining 1 − d can be financed using capital k or bonds b. Using capital
2Assuming that banks pay a flat payment for this insurance does not alter out main
results.
3We assume that the liquidation value of the long term investment is null. In the
appendix we relax this assumption.
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conveys a substantial cost ρ > 1. In the general framework, we assume that
bonds are insured, which allows to normalize its cost to one as well.
In the context of this model, we analyze the decision made by the bank
in terms of monitoring effort and liquidity reserves. Additionally, we assess
the optimal requirements for capital and liquidity, that a regulator would
choose.
Time line of the model
Regulator decides:
Capital and liquidity req.
Bank decides:
Monitoring effort - θ
Liquidity reserves - λ
t = 0
Early withdrawals - β
Bank paybacks or fails
t = 1
Projects succeeds with prob. θ
Bank paybacks debt or fails
t = 2
3.3.1 Banks’ maximization problem
Before analyzing the regulator’s optimal policy, we need to determine bank’s
maximizing strategy, since this will be an important factor driving the choice
of the regulator.
First, we analyze bank’s optimal monitoring effort and liquidity reserves.
Then, we will assess the effect of liquid assets on banks’ monitoring θ. Liq-
uidity has a dual effect on bank’s monitoring decision. On the one hand, it
reduces the likelihood of failing due to early withdrawals. On the other hand
it decreases the share of funds invested in the long term asset, decreasing
bank’s future value if the project is successful.
In this section, we consider that other debt b is insured as well. This
means that 1−k is the amount of secured debt (deposits d and other debt b)
held by the bank. These deposits and debt are paid only if the bank survives
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early withdrawals and the project succeeds (there is limited liability).
Then, banks decide on their asset structure (liquidity or long term in-
vestment) and their monitoring effort, in order to maximize the following
problem: 4
Π ≡ max
0≤λ≤d
0≤θ≤1
0≤k≤1−d
∫ λ
0
θ [M(1− λ) + (λ− β)− (d− β)− (1− k − d)] f(β)dβ − c
2
θ2 − ρk,
(3.1)
where M(1 − λ) stands for the profits derived from the long term in-
vestment, and (λ− β) is the cash remaining after paying back early deposit
withdrawals. Finally, the bank has to pay (d− β) and (1− k − d) at period
two, which represent all remaining depositors and other debt. These pay-
ments are conditional on the bank surviving early deposit withdrawals, i.e.
β ∈ [0, λ], and the long term project being successful (with probability θ).
Using the Leibniz’s rule for differentiating under the integral, we can get
the First Order Conditions (FOC s) for the optimal monitoring and liquidity:
[θ] : θb =
1
c
∫ λ
0
[M(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)] f(β)dβ = F (λ)
c
[M(1− λ) + λ− (1− k)] ,
(3.2)
[λ] : θ [M(1− λ) + λ− (1− k)] f(λ)−
∫ λ
0
θ(M − 1)f(β)dβ = 0
⇔ F (λ) θ(1−M) + θ [M(1− λ) + λ− (1− k)] f (λ) = 0.
(3.3)
4In the absence of regulation on capital, banks would always choose k = 0, since the
cost of capital is greater than the cost of secured debt ρ > 1 (Repullo, 2005)
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Equation (3.2) shows that bank’s monitoring effort increases with the
probability of surviving liquidity withdrawals, and bank’s future cash flows
(that depends on the amount invested in the investment project). In these
cases, the bank will be willing to monitor more diligently in order to boost
the likelihood of success and receive this higher payment. Additionally, it is
straightforward from equation (3.2) that increasing capital k will lead to a
higher θb (
∂θb
∂k
> 0). This is explained by the fact that the bank has more
skin in the game when it pledges more capital.
As argued before, the relationship between θ and λ is an important factor.
Monitoring effort increases with bank’s revenues, while liquidity reserves have
a dual effect on these expected profits. This duality will shape the relationship
between liquidity and monitoring effort. For relatively low levels of liquidity,
increasing liquid assets will boost bank’s future expected profits by increasing
the survival probability. Nevertheless, when liquidity reserves are high, the
effect on the survival probability will be dominated by the reduction on the
share invested on the long term project. Then, bank’s future expected profits
will decrease, reducing the incentives to monitor the investment. Both effects
coupled together will determine the relationship between θ and λ, as stated
in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The optimal monitoring effort chosen by the bank is a hump-
shaped function of liquidity reserves.
Proof. See proof in the appendix 3.5
Proposition 1 entails that liquidity has an important effect on solvency
risk. This link between liquidity and monitoring, will be the main driver of
the interaction between capital and liquidity requirements from a regulatory
perspective.
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Finally, equation 3.3 implies that the bank will choose the level of liquidity
that maximizes its profits. But, if bank’s profits are higher, the incentives to
monitor will increase as well. Then, if liquidity maximizes the future expected
value of the bank, it will maximize the monitoring effort as well.
Lemma 1 The level of liquidity chosen by the bank, will maximize the mon-
itoring effort.
Proof. See proof in the appendix 3.5
3.3.2 Regulator’s maximization problem
Now, we analyze the problem of a regulator that sets capital and liquidity
requirements to improve social welfare. But in order to induce the proper
effect, the regulator takes into consideration bank’s optimal monitoring re-
sponse to the regulatory environment. That is, how would the bank react to
capital and liquidity regulation.
Capital requirements are used to increase bank’s skin in the game, im-
proving their incentives to monitoring. On the other hand, liquidity require-
ments are used to reduce the likelihood that banks fail due to excessive early
withdrawals. The objectives of these regulatory tools are different, since sol-
vency and liquidity risk are independent in the model. Nevertheless, there is
an interdependence between the optimal capital and liquidity requirements,
which arises from the effect of liquidity on monitoring (proposition 1). This
interaction will shape the regulatory policy, providing a taxonomy for the
optimal capital requirement in terms of liquidity (or the optimal liquidity
requirement in terms of capital).
In this context, the regulator solves the following problem, taking as given
bank’s optimal monitoring response from equation (3.2):
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ΠR ≡ max
0≤k≤1−d
0≤λ≤d
∫ λ
0
θbM(1− λ)f(β)dβ + λ− (1− k)− c
2
θ2b − ρk.
Given that the regulator is not protected by limited liability, it always
considers total debt (1− k) in its utility function. We can restate the above
problem as follows:
ΠR ≡ θbχ(λ)− (1− λ)− c
2
θ2b − (ρ− 1)k, (3.4)
where χ(λ) = F (λ)M(1 − λ) represents the expected value for the loan
(conditional on the project being successful). Additionally, (1−λ) represents
the cost to invest in the risky project, while (ρ − 1) stands for the “shadow
cost” of using capital (since it is more expensive compared to deposits or
insured debt). The corresponding FOC s for capital and liquidity are:
[k] :
∂θb
∂k
[χ(λ)− cθb] = ρ− 1, (3.5)
[λ] : 1 + θb
∂χ(λ)
∂λ
+
∂θb
∂λ
[χ(λ)− cθb] = 0. (3.6)
The term in brackets on the Left Hand Side (LHS) of equation (3.5)
presents the marginal benefit from monitoring. From equation (3.2), we know
that capital increases bank’s monitoring. Then, the whole term presents the
change in the expected benefits associated with changes in capital. The
corresponding Right Hand Side (RHS) presents the shadow cost of capital.
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It is noteworthy the fact that regulator’s liquidity (equation 3.6) is always
higher than bank’s liquidity choice (equation 3.3). This means that, the
liquidity requirements set by the regulator are binding for the bank. The
reason is that liquidity has a higher social than private value: it reduces
the losses when the bank is liquidated due to early withdrawals. This social
benefit is not considered by the bank since it is protected by limited liability,
but the regulator takes into account this on its maximization problem. The
following lemma formally express this result:
Lemma 2 The optimal liquidity requirement for the regulator is always bind-
ing for the bank.
Proof. See proof in the appendix 3.5
In order to characterize the relationship between capital and liquidity
requirements, first we need to analyze the effect of the latter on social wel-
fare. There are three channels in which liquidity affects the utility function
of the regulator. These can be analyzed in equation (3.6). The first term
(1) shows that higher liquidity always decreases the social cost of bank’s fail-
ure.5 The second term shows the effect of liquidity in the expected value
for the investment project (∂χ(λ)
∂λ
). Here, λ increases the survival probability
at the cost of reducing the long term investment. This trade-off leads to a
hump-shaped relationship between liquidity and the expected value for the
long term investment. Finally, the last term shows that liquidity reduces
bank’s incentives to monitor (∂θb
∂λ
), given the marginal benefit from moni-
toring (χ(λ) − cθb). Since the liquidity requirement is binding for the bank
(lemma 2), and bank’s liquidity choice maximizes the its monitoring effort
(lemma 1), increasing liquidity requirements will reduce bank’s monitoring.
5The recovery value of liquidity is always higher than the liquidation value of the long
term project. The model assumes that the recovery value for the long term asset is zero.
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Then, this last term represents the reduction in the expected payment from
monitoring, due to an increase in liquidity.
As stated before, liquidity is used to enhance the likelihood of surviving
early withdrawals, while capital is used to reduce solvency risk. Despite the
fact that liquidity and solvency risk are independent, liquidity and capital
requirements are interrelated. Hence, we analyze the effect of capital on the
optimal liquidity requirement.
Let us start assuming that k is low, and bank’s incentives to monitor
are low (just like the future expected value of the project). As we increase
capital, bank’s incentives to monitor raise (through the skin in the game
channel), boosting the future expected value of the project. Then, in order to
capitalize the larger future expected value of the project, regulator’s incentives
to increase liquidity requirements will be higher (the regulator increases the
probability of survival by increasing liquidity). On the other hand, if k is too
large (and so is bank’s monitoring), the opportunity cost of liquidity is higher,
since the future expected payment from the long term project is high. Then,
further increases in capital will be accompanied by reductions in liquidity
requirements. This idea is formally presented in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 The optimal liquidity requirements λ∗R are a hump-shaped re-
sponse to capital levels.
Proof. See proof in the appendix 3.5
In order to complement our previous intuition, let us analyze the changes
in equation (3.6) whenever there is a change in capital, and evaluate it on
the optimal liquidity requirement (λ∗R(k)):
∂2ΠR(k, λ
∗
R(k))
∂λ∂k
=
∂θb
∂k
∂χ(λ)
∂λ
+
∂2θb
∂λ∂k
[χ(λ)− cθb]− c∂θb
∂λ
∂θb
∂k
(3.7)
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The first term shows the effect of changes in capital on monitoring, given
the effect of liquidity on the expected value of the project. Then, it rep-
resents the effect of capital in the opportunity cost of liquidity. Increasing
capital leads to a higher monitoring, which in terms increases expected value
of the investment project, as well as the opportunity cost of the liquidity.
This creates a substitution effect between λ and k. The second term shows
that higher capital will reduce the contraction in monitoring effort that is
associated with higher liquidity requirements, since ∂
2θb
∂λ∂k
= f(λ)
c
> 0. This
suggests a complementarity effect between λ and k. Finally, the last term
shows the reduction in the monitoring cost induced by the changes in capital
and liquidity. This reinforces the complementarity effect between these tools.
Then, lemma 3 implies that when k is low, capital and the optimal liquid-
ity requirements are complementary. On the other hand, when k is higher,
capital and the optimal liquidity requirement are substitutes.
Finally, we analyze the effect of changes in liquidity on the optimal capital
requirement. Let us assume a situation with low liquidity with a low likeli-
hood of surviving early withdrawals. Hence, the incentives of the regulator
to use capital are low as well (even with perfect monitoring, the expected
value of the project is low due to liquidity risk). As we increase liquidity,
survival probability increases as well, driving up regulator’s incentives to use
capital to induce monitoring. On the other hand, if liquidity is higher (as
well as survival probability), the share of funds invested in the long term
asset is low. Then, regulator’s incentives to use capital to induce monitoring
is lower, since the future expected value of the project is low (due to a low
investment). This idea can be formally stated as the following lemma:
Lemma 4 The optimal capital requirements k∗R are a hump-shaped response
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to liquidity levels.
Proof. See proof in the appendix 3.5
To provide additional insights on this, let us rewrite equation (3.7), but
evaluating it on the optimal capital requirement as a function of liquidity
(k∗R(λ)):
∂2ΠR(k
∗
R(λ), λ)
∂k∂λ
=
∂θb
∂k
[
∂χ(λ)
∂λ
− c∂θb
∂λ
]
+
∂2θb
∂k∂λ
[χ(λ)− cθb]. (3.8)
The first term reflects the product between the change in monitoring
due to changes in capital, and the variation of the marginal benefit from
monitoring associated with a change in liquidity. This term inside brackets
shows the effect of increasing liquidity on the marginal value of monitoring.
To understand better the behavior of this term, let us define λa such that
for lower values, the term inside brackets is positive, i.e. [χ′(λ)− c∂θb
∂λ
] > 0.6
Then, increasing liquidity will increase the marginal utility of monitoring
when λ < λa (complementarity effect), while for λ > λa increasing liquidity
will reduce the marginal benefit of monitoring (substitutability effect). The
second term of equation (3.8) reflects a complementarity effect between λ
and k. The first factor ( ∂
2θb
∂k∂λ
) shows that liquidity increases the sensitivity of
the monitoring effort to changes in capital (given a reduction in the liquidity
risk).7 The second factor is the marginal benefit from monitoring, which
is positive. Then, lemma 4 implies that for high levels of λ, liquidity and
capital are substitutes. On the other hand, if λ is low, liquidity and capital
6The existence of λa is guaranteed, since f(λ) is log-concave and k
∗
R(λ) is an increasing
function on ∂
2ΠR
∂k∂λ > 0.
7Remember that ∂
2θb
∂λ∂k =
f(λ∗R)
c > 0.
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are complementary.
So far, the analysis shows that capital and liquidity requirements can be
complements or substitutes, depending on their quantities. For low levels
of liquidity (capital), these tools are complements, but for higher levels of
liquidity (capital) they become substitutes. In equilibrium, when the regula-
tor chooses capital and liquidity requirements simultaneously, the degree of
complementarity (or substitutability) depends on the shadow cost of capital.
Whenever capital is relatively cheap (below ρˆ), the regulator will find it
optimal to use relatively large amounts of capital. This means that bank’s
incentives to monitor the investment project are higher, increasing the op-
portunity cost of liquidity. Hence, further increases in capital should be
accompanied by reductions in liquidity, since these liquid assets will become
even costlier (lemma 4). Then, k and λ are substitutes. On the other hand,
when the cost of capital is higher (above ρˆ), regulators will set lower require-
ments (since it is costlier than before). The bank will have little incentives to
monitor the investment, and the opportunity cost of liquidity will be lower.
Then, further increasing capital should be accompanied by increases in liq-
uidity, which is a relatively inexpensive tool to enhance survival probability.
Hence, k and λ are complementary tools. This idea can be summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 2 There is a level ρˆ for the cost of capital, such that: for ρ < ρˆ
liquidity and capital are substitutes, but for ρ > ρˆ they become complemen-
taries.
Proof. See proof in the appendix 3.5
This proposition implies that the shadow cost of capital will determine
whether liquidity and capital are complementary or substitutes tools.
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In order to further explain this proposition we use Figure 3.1. Here, k∗R(λ)
represents regulator’s optimal capital response to a given level of liquidity,
and λ∗R(k) stands for the regulator’s optimal liquidity response to a given
level of capital. The intersection between these functions will determine
the optimal regulatory policy in terms of capital and liquidity requirements.
Additionally, the line Π¯12(λ, k), shows all the possible combinations between
k and λ such that the second-order mixed derivative equals zero, i.e. (∂
2ΠR
∂λ∂k
=
0). This means that, the maximum values for λ∗R(k) and k
∗
R(λ) lie in the line
Π¯12. From this figure, we observe that to the left of the intersection between
k∗R(λ) and Π¯12, liquidity and capital are complementaries (if the regulator
choses k, with an exogenous λ). On the other hand, to the right of the
intersection between these two curves, k and λ are substitutes.8
From the regulator’s FOCs (equations 3.5 and 3.6), we know that the cost
of capital only affects the optimal capital requirement k∗R(λ), but does not
affect the optimal liquidity requirement λ∗R(k). Then, a reduction on ρ will
lead to a parallel upward shift on k∗R(λ), but will have no effect on λ
∗
R(k).
For example, let us assume a sufficiently high cost of capital ρ0. Since
capital is socially costly, the regulator will choose a low level of capital re-
quirements, given by k∗R(λ; ρ0). Additionally, regulator’s choice of liquidity
λ∗R(k
∗
ρ0
) will be low as well. Then, both instruments will be complementary
tools. As the cost of capital decreases, regulator’s incentives to use k will in-
crease (we move along the line λ∗R(k) to the new intersection). This reduction
on the shadow cost of capital, leads to a higher use of liquidity as well (but
at a decreasing rate). Consider now the situation when the cost of capital is
sufficiently low (ρ1). The new equilibrium lies to the right of the Π¯12 line, on
the decreasing section of λ∗R(k). In this region, the reduction in the expected
8A similar analysis arises when analyzing the intersections between Π¯12 y λ
∗
R(k).
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value of monitoring, is exceeded by the increase in the opportunity cost of
liquidity (when capital increases). Then, the optimal liquidity choice for the
regulator will be lower (the tools become substitutes).
3.4 Extensions
In this section we present a set of extensions on the basic setup. We start
introducing a modified version of the model, which includes a Lender of
Last Resort (LoLR). This will have as a consequence the disappearance of
liquidity risk of the model, i.e. the bank will no longer fail due to early
withdrawals, since it can always come the LoLR to obtain additional liquidity.
Then, we present a model that includes the possibility of fire sales, i.e. the
bank is able to sell long term assets at an intermediate period in order to
obtain additional liquid funds. This will reduce liquidity risk, but it will
not eliminate it though. Afterwards, we extend the model by assuming that
uncorrelated loans’ success probability. In this context we also introduce
a systemic shock, which is independent of the monitoring effort. This will
introduce a new effect of capital, i.e. it will work as a buffer enhancing
bank’s ability to survive systemic shocks. Then, we include an extension
with a wholesales market. In this case, the bank will obtain a fraction of its
funds from short term sophisticated creditors. In this setting, the bank will
have to rollover part of this uninsured debt. In order to do this, it will have
to pay creditors an interest rate that compensates for the level of solvency
risk. Finally, we include an extension introducing the interbank market.
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3.4.1 Lender of Last Resort
We can extend the model by including a LoLR. In this case, if deposit with-
drawals exceed liquidity reserves, the bank can obtain the additional liquid
funds via a LoLR.9 But in order to receive these funds, the bank will pay the
social cost of liquidity (exogenous ρL).
10
If the LoLR always provides liquidity support at t = 1, liquidity risk
disappears, i.e. the bank is always able to satisfy deposit withdrawals. The
reason to hold liquidity (for the bank) will change. Then, the bank will
have incentives to raise liquid funds only to reduce the likelihood of requir-
ing financial assistance from the LoLR. The bank will solve the following
problem:
Π ≡
∫ λ
0
θ [M(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)] f(β)dβ+∫ d
λ
θ [M(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)− (ρL − 1)(β − λ)] f(β)dβ − c
2
θ2 − ρk.
The first integral represents the case when liquidity reserves are enough
to satisfy early withdrawals (similar to the original setting). The second
integral corresponds to the case when liquidity is not enough, and the bank
needs to get liquidity from the LoLR. Note that in this case, the amount of
deposits due at t = 2 is lower (1 − k − β), since β > λ. Nevertheless, the
bank has to pay ρL for each unit of liquidity that requires from the LoLR.
The corresponding FOCs with respect to monitoring and liquidity are:
9For the sake of simplicity, the LoLR will be the same agent who imposes capital and
liquidity requirements, i.e. the regulator.
10This cost of liquidity will have an upper and lower bound in order to have an interior
solution, i.e. M < ρL <
M
d . If liquidity is too inexpensive, the bank (and regulator) will
find it optimal to set λ = 0 and rely always on the LoLR. On the other hand, if liquidity is
too expensive the bank will not use the LoLR facility, since its cost would be prohibitive.
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[θ] : θ∗L =
M(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)− ∫ d
λ
(ρL − 1)(β − λ)f(β)dβ
c
[λ] : 1−M + (1− F (λ))(ρL − 1) = 0
Since there is no liquidity risk on the project, its future expected value
is higher. This increases bank’s incentives to monitor. By the same token,
liquidity reserves are going to be lower compared to the baseline model. The
relationship between monitoring and liquidity is still hump-shaped. But the
mechanism is slightly different: liquidity reduces the amount invested in the
long term asset, but it reduces the need to rely on the LoLR. This last effect
is particularly strong when the cost of liquidity is sufficiently large.
Proposition 3 When the bank is able to receive liquidity support from a
LoLR, monitoring effort is a hump-shaped function of liquidity, and the op-
timal level of liquidity will be such that maximizes monitoring (similar to the
baseline model). Nevertheless, the mechanism is different: increasing liquid-
ity reduces the proportion invested in the long term project (like in the basic
setup), but instead of reducing liquidity risk it will reduce the likelihood of
using the “expensive” LoLR facility. Finally, it is worth mentioning that a
bank protected by a LoLR will choose a higher monitoring effort, since there
no liquidity risk affecting the long term project.
Proof. See proof in the appendix 3.5
In a setting with a LoLR, the regulator solves the following problem:
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ΠR ≡
∫ λ
0
θ [M(1− λ)] f(β)dβ +
∫ d
λ
[θM(1− λ)− ρL(β − λ)] f(β)dβ − (1− λ− k)− c
2
θ2 − ρk.
Note that a regulator acting as a LoLR will pay the cost of liquidity
every time the bank does not have enough liquid assets to pay for deposit
withdrawals (regardless of whether the project is successful and the bank pays
for this facility, or not). The corresponding FOC’s for capital and liquidity
are:
[k] : k∗R = 1− λ− c(ρ− 1) + ρL
∫ d
λ
(β − λ)f(β)dβ
[λ] :
∂θ
∂λ
[
1− λ− k + ρL
∫ d
λ
(β − λ)f(β)dβ
]
−Mθ + 1 + ρL
∫ d
λ
(β − λ)f(β)dβ = 0
In this case, the regulator will set higher capital requirements, compared
to the case with no LoLR. The reason is that higher capital will induce
monitoring, which in turn increases the probability that the regulator receives
the payment from the bank corresponding to the LoLR loan. Additionally,
we know that increasing liquidity will reduce the optimal capital requirement
∂k∗R
∂λ
< 0, i.e. capital and liquidity are substitutes.
Proposition 4 When the regulator acts as a LoLR, the optimal capital re-
quirement is a decreasing function liquidity. This means that liquidity and
capital are substitutes in this setting.
Proof. See proof in the appendix 3.5
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3.4.2 Fire Sales
Previously, we assume that the liquidation value for the long term project
was zero. If liquidity reserves are not enough to pay for deposit withdrawals,
liquidating the long term asset would not help closing this gap. Now relax this
assumption, and allow the bank to liquidate part of its long term investment
to meet any remaining liquidity demand that can not be satisfied using only
liquid reserves. Nevertheless, this liquidation comes at a cost, since in order
to obtain one additional unit of liquidity we need to liquidate L > 1 of long
term assets (loans) at t = 1. That is, the investment project is sold at a fire
sale price.
In this setting, the bank solves the following problem:
Π ≡
∫ λ
0
θ [M(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)] f(β)dβ+∫ β
λ
θ {M [1− λ− (β − λ)L]− (1− k − β)} f(β)dβ − c
2
θ2 − ρk.
The first integral correspond to the case in which liquidity is sufficient to
pay early withdrawals. The second integral shows the case when liquidity is
not enough, and the bank needs to liquidate part of the long term asset. Note
that the upper bound for this integral is β. For deposit withdrawals beyond
this level, the bank can not raise enough liquidity to satisfy withdrawals,
even in the case that all the long term project is liquidated. It is noteworthy
the fact that, if the bank survives early withdrawals by liquidating assets,
the amount invested in the project is lower. Additionally, the proportion of
deposits due at t = 2 is lower, since β > λ. The corresponding FOCs for
monitoring and liquidity are:
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[θ] : θ∗ =
1
c
F (λ) [M(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)] +
1
c
∫ β
λ
{M [1− λ− (β − λ)L]− (1− k − β)} f(β)dβ
[λ] : F (λ)(1−M) + [F (β)− F (λ)]M(L− 1) = 0
In this case, monitoring will be higher. The reason is that liquidity risk
is lower, given the option to liquidate long term project in an intermediate
period. Hence, for each level of liquidity monitoring will be higher compared
to the case with no fire sales. By the same token, liquidity reserves will be
lower, since the bank is less subject to liquidity risk.
Lemma 5 When the bank is able to liquidate investment, its optimal liquid-
ity choice increases with the liquidation cost of the long term asset.
Proof. See proof in the appendix 3.5
In this case, the regulator sets capital and liquidity requirements to solve
the following problem:
ΠR ≡
∫ λ
0
θM(1− λ)f(β)dβ +
∫ β
λ
θM [1− λ− (β − λ)L] f(β)dβ − (1− k − λ)− c
2
θ2 − ρk.
Note that in this problem, the probability of failing due to early with-
drawals is lower. Nevertheless, regardless of whether the project succeeds or
fails, the regulator will always take into account total debt (1− k − λ). The
corresponding FOCs for capital and liquidity are:
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[k] :
∂θb
∂k
F (λ)M(1− λ) + ∂θb
∂k
∫ β
λ
M [1− λ− (β − λ)L] f(β)dβ − cθb∂θb
∂k
= ρ− 1
[λ] : 1− F (λ)θbM +
∫ β
λ
θbM(L− 1)f(β)dβ − θbM(1− λ) = 0
3.4.3 Uncorrelated loans
So far, we implicitly assume that all long term assets were perfectly corre-
lated, i.e. θ determines the success probability for all investment projects.
This means that either all loans pay or none of them do so. We relax this
by assuming that all projects are completely independent, i.e. some of the
loans will succeed while some other will fail. Then, if we have a continuum
of projects, θ will determine the proportion of successful ones.
In order to introduce some uncertainty on bank’s decision, we include a
systemic shock γ ∈ [0, 2] that affects the return of bank’s investment project.
This shock takes place at period t = 2, affecting the return of the long term
project, , such that E(γ × M) = M . 11 The realization of this shock is
independent of the monitoring effort (and credit risk).
This shock is unknown beforehand, but it follows a known distribution
with cdf G(γ). Similar to liquidity withdrawals, we only assume that the
corresponding probability density function g(γ) is log-concave and smooth.
Whenever γ = 1, the investment project’s return are unaffected, i.e. the
long term asset yields M when successful. As we decrease γ, the payment
11Loans’ expected value is the same as in the baseline model.
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of the project decreases. In the extreme case when γ = 0, the project is
completely worthless, despite what the monitoring effort is. On the other
hand, if γ = 2 the investment is twice as profitable compared to the baseline
scenario. We may interpret this, as the realization of the state of nature
that affects evenly all investment projects in the economy, e.g. for high
γ investment’s yields are high across the economy, while for a lower γ the
yields for any investment project is low. Then, if the state of nature γ is
sufficiently low (i.e. below γ), the return of those successful projects might
not be sufficient to pay bank’s creditors, i.e. the bank becomes insolvent and
fails (we assume a null recovery value in this case). The tolerance to this
systemic shock will depend on bank’s balance sheet structure.
In this setting, capital will have a dual effect on monitoring. First, the
bank will increase θ via the usual skin on the game channel. Additionally,
by reducing the proportion of assets funded with deposits (lowering bank’s
limited liability), capital will create a buffer against unexpected systemic
shocks. This buffer will allow the bank to survive shocks that otherwise
would have led to failure. This will further raise bank’s incentives to monitor.
Then, the bank solves the following problem:
Π ≡
∫ λ
0
{∫ 2
γ
θ [γM(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)] g(γ)dγ
}
f(β)dβ − c
2
θ2 − ρk.
If γ < γ the bank will fail, irrespective of the monitoring effort, since the
yield from the long term project (M × γ) would not be enough to pay back
debt. Then, the threshold for the systemic shock such that the bank fails is
given by γ = 1−λ−k
M(1−λ) . Note that γ decreases with k and λ. This means that
capital and liquidity increase the tolerance to a systemic shock, allowing the
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bank to survive a deeper shock. The corresponding FOCs are:
[θ] : θSR =
F (λ)
{∫ 2
γ
[γM(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)] g(γ)dγ
}
c
[λ] :
∫ 2
γ
{f(λ) [γM(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)] + F (λ)(1−Mγ)} g(γ)dγ
Similar to the baseline model, θSR will be a hump-shaped function of λ
in the presence of a systemic shock. For low levels of liquidity, increasing
liquid assets enhance bank’s incentives to monitor the project. On the other
hand, when liquidity reserves are higher, further increases in liquid assets
will result in lower monitoring.
Proposition 5 When bank’s loans are uncorrelated and there is a systemic
shock, monitoring continues to be a hump-shaped function of λ, and bank’s
liquidity choice will maximize θSR.
Proof. See proof in the appendix 3.5
3.4.4 Wholesales Market
Now we introduce an alternative source of funding. The bank uses deposits
d, capital k and short term uninsured debt (1−d−k), e.g. wholesales market.
This debt is ought to be paid at period t = 1, but creditors might be willing
to rollover debt until period t = 2 (for the corresponding price). But in
order to do so, they demand a higher payment, which depends on bank’s
solvency risk. We assume these creditors are sophisticated, i.e. they are able
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to perfectly observe bank’s monitoring effort θ at t = 1. Hence, they will
charge 1
θ
for each unit they rollover. 12
In this setting, whenever deposit withdrawals are higher than bank’s liq-
uidity reserves (β > λ), the bank is liquidated and makes zero profit. But
when liquidity is sufficient to satisfy early deposit withdrawals we may face
two different cases. If deposit withdrawals are sufficiently small, the bank
does not need to rollover short term debt, i.e. cash reserves (after paying
depositors) are enough to pay short term creditors at t = 1. This occurs
for β < λ − (1 − d − k). The alternative is a situation in which liquidity is
sufficient to satisfy depositors, but the remaining is not enough to cancel all
short term debt. This means that the bank will need to rollover a fraction
of this debt.
Bank’s maximization problem is given by the following expression:
Π ≡
∫ λ+k+d−1
0
[M(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)] f(β)dβ+∫ λ
λ+k+d−1
[
M(1− λ)− (d− β)− (1− d− k)− (λ− β)
θ
]
f(β)dβ − c
2
θ2 − ρk.
The first integral captures the case in which liquidity is enough to pay
back both early withdrawals and all short term debt. This case resembles the
baseline model. The second integral corresponds to the situation in which
liquid assets are sufficient to satisfy deposit withdrawals, but not to pay all
short term debt. In this case, the bank needs to rollover (1−d−k)− (λ−β)
for which it pays 1
θ
. Additionally, the bank still needs to pay (d−β) deposits
at t = 2. The FOCs for the bank are:
12The interest payment for short term creditors at t = 1 is 1. We are assuming implicitly
that in case of default at t = 1 due to liquidity problems, bank’s remaining assets are
enough to payback these creditors.
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[θ] : θ∗ =
1
c
∫ λ+k+d−1
0
(M(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)) f(β)dβ+
1
c
∫ λ
λ+k+d−1
(M(1− λ)− (d− β)) f(β)dβ
[λ] :
∫ λ+k+d−1
0
(1− θM)f(β)dβ+∫ λ
λ+k+d−1
(
1
θ
−Mθ
)
f(β)dβ + θ
[
M(1− λ)− (1 + λ)− 1− d− k
θ
]
f(λ) = 0
When including this alternative source of funds, the hump-shaped rela-
tionship between θ and λ prevails. Hence, increasing liquidity will have a
dual effect on monitoring.
3.5 Conclusions
The last financial crisis showed the existence of a regulatory gap regarding
liquidity standards. Regulators are turning their attention to these issues,
and have started implementing liquidity requirements as a way to prevent
future liquidity shortages, enhancing financial stability and reducing the need
of public support to distressed institutions. The new rules in Basel III (with
the LCR and the NSFR) are a clear example of this new regulatory focus.
In order to study this regulatory issue, we develop a model to analyze
bank’s endogenous decisions on liquidity reserves and risk taking. Liquidity
has a dual effect: it reduces the risk of failing due to early withdrawals, at the
cost of a lower investment in the long term asset. In this context, a regulator
will set capital and liquidity requirements in order to maximize social welfare.
In equilibrium, we find that the optimal capital and liquidity requirements
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are closely related. These regulatory tools can be complements or substitutes,
depending on the shadow cost of capital. When this is relatively expensive,
regulators will set lower levels of capital, leading to a complementary rela-
tionship with liquidity. On the other hand, if capital is cheaper, regulators
will set higher requirements on capital, leading to a substitutability effect
with liquidity.
There are important implications in terms of regulatory standards. An-
alyzing the regulator’s problem, we find that it is socially desirable to im-
plement liquidity requirements, since they will always be binding. But a
regulator that focuses only on liquidity requirements, without explicitly ac-
counting for its adverse consequences on monitoring, might not be able to
achieve an adequate level of risk, nor to maximize social welfare. It is im-
portant for regulators to recognize the interdependence between capital and
liquidity requirements.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: The effect of ρ on the degree of substitution/complementarity
Note: On the vertical axis we measure capital, and on the horizontal axis liquidity.
The Π¯12 line (green line) represents all the possible combinations between λ and k, that
maximize the optimal capital (liquidity) chosen by the regulator. The yellow line λ∗R(k)
stands for regulator’s optimal liquidity choice for a given level of capital. The blue curve
k∗R(λ, ρ0) stands for regulator’s optimal capital for any given level of liquidity. A is the
optimal capital and liquidity bundle, when the cost of capital is high (ρ0 > ρ1). In
this state, both regulatory tools are complementaries. If we decrease the cost of capital,
regulator’s optimal choice of capital as a function of liquidity k∗R(λ, ρ1) shifts upward (red
curve). B is the corresponding optimal bundle of capital and liquidity for a relatively
lower cost of capital (ρ1 < ρ0). In this stage, these regulatory tools become substitutes.
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Proofs
Proposition 1
In order to prove that θb(λ) is a hump-shaped function of λ, we will show that
there is only one value for liquidity λb, such that
∂θb(λb)
∂λ
= 0. Additionally, we
will show that this derivative is positive for any λ < λb, while it is negative
for any λ > λb. These facts characterize θb(λ) as a hump-shaped function of
λ.
We start differentiating bank’s monitoring effort (equation 3.2) with re-
spect to liquidity:
∂θb(λ)
∂λ
=
f (λ)
dc
[M(1− λ)− (1− λ− k)] + F (λ)
c
(1−M)⇔
=
F (λ)
c
{
[M(1− λ)− (1− λ− k)]
d
f (λ)
F (λ)
+ 1−M
}
.
(3.9)
The sign of equation (3.9) is determined by the expression inside braces.
Due to the log-concavity assumption on f(β), we know that f(λ)
F (λ)
decreases
with liquidity (it approaches to infinity as λ→ 0). Then, for λ→ 0 we know
that ∂θb
∂λ
> 0, i.e. when liquidity is low, increasing λ increases monitoring.
Now, we look for the condition such that the expression inside braces in
equation (3.9) is negative for high values of λ, so that ∂θb
∂λ
< 0. Then, for
higher values of λ, increasing liquidity will reduce monitoring. Let us set
capital and liquidity at their corresponding extreme values in equation (3.9),
i.e. (k, λ) = (1− d, d): 13
13Since equation (3.9) is increasing in k, we can assume without loss of generality that
k = 1− d. Hence the condition will be satisfied for all possible k ≤ 1− d.
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∂θb(λ)
∂λ
=
1
c
{
[M(1− d)]
d
f(d) + 1−M
}
< 0,
only if:
d >
f(d)M
M − 1 +Mf(d) . (3.10)
Note that this condition is decreasing in M , so we can always find a
value for M such that it is satisfied. Then, under condition (3.10) equation
(3.9) is negative as λ → d, since f(λ)
F (λ)
decreases (due to the log-concavity
assumption).
Since equation (3.9) is positive for λ → 0, and negative for λ → d, the
fact that this is a continuous function guarantees that it equals zero at least
once.
The term inside braces in equation (3.9) decreases monotonically in λ.
This fact guarantees that there is only one value for λ = λb such that
∂θb(λb)
∂λ
=
0. This implies that for any λ ≥ λb, equation (3.9) is negative. On the other
hand, it will be positive on the interval [0, λb). Hence, we can conclude
that θb(λ) has a single peak, and therefore it is a hump-shaped function of
liquidity.
Lemma 1
From equation (3.9), stated in the proof for proposition 1, we know that λb
satisfies:
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∂θb(λb)
∂λ
=
f (λb)
dc
[M(1− λb)− (1− λb − k)] + F (λb)
c
(1−M) = 0
⇔ F (λb) (1−M) + [M(1− λb) + λb − (1− k)] f (λb)
d
= 0,
such that θb is maximized at λb. But this expression is equivalent to the
bank’s FOC with respect to λ (equation 3.3). Hence, λb not only maximizes
bank’s monitoring effort θb(λ), but also represents bank’s optimal liquidity
choice (the one that maximizes profits).
Lemma 2
We want to show that regulator’s liquidity requirements are binding for the
bank, i.e λ∗R > λb. In order to do this, we are going to compare liquidity’s
FOC for the bank and regulator.
First, and for the sake of notation, let us define φ = M(1 − λ) − (1 −
λ− k) throughout this proof. Then, we can restate bank’s FOC for θ and λ
(equations 3.2 and 3.3) as follows:
θb =
F (λ)
c
φ,
f(λ)
F (λ)
φ+ 1−M = 0.
Additionally, we rearrange regulator’s maximization problem (equation
3.4) as follows:
ΠR(λ) =
F (λ)2φ2
2c
−
[
1− F (λ)
2φ
c
]
(1− λ− k)− ρk.
Using this expression for the problem of the regulator, the corresponding
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FOC with respect to λ is:
∂ΠR(λ)
∂λ
=
F (λ)2
c
φ
[
f(λ)
F (λ)
φ+ (1−M)
]
+
[
1− F (λ)
2φ
c
]
+ (1− λ− k)F (λ
2)
c
[
2
f(λ)φ
F (λ)
+ (1−M)
]
.
Then, we need to evaluate this expression on bank’s optimal liquidity (λb).
The first term on the Right Hand Side (RHS) equals zero, since the term in
brackets corresponds to bank’s FOC for liquidity. By the same token, the
third term on the RHS is positive. Finally, using bank’s FOC for monitoring,
we know that the second term on the RHS is positive as well. This means
that ∂ΠR(λb)
∂λ
> 0.
This finding coupled with the fact that ∂
2ΠR(λb)
∂λ2
< 0 , and the log-
concavity assumption on f(β), implies that λ∗R > λb.
Lemma 3
This lemma states that regulator’s optimal capital requirement is a hump-
shaped function of liquidity.
Let us start rewriting regulator’s FOC for capital (equation 3.5) as follows:
k∗R(λ) = 1− λ−
(ρ− 1)c
F (λ)2
, (3.11)
where k∗R(λ) is a concave function, since
∂2k∗
∂λ2
< 0. 14
In order to prove that k∗R(λ) is a hump-shaped function of λ, we need to
show the existence of a value for liquidity λ < d, such that ∂k
∗
∂λ
= 0 (given
14In order to find an interior solution for capital, we restrict the values of ρ on the
interval [ρ, ρ]. We set the lower bound for the cost of capital ρ, such that the maximum
level of capital chosen by the regulator is not higher than the natural bound for capital,
i.e. max
λ
k∗R ≤ 1− d. On the other hand, to guarantee that the regulator has incentives to
use capital k∗R(d) > 0, we set the upper-bound for capital cost ρ < 1 +
1−d
c .
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the concavity of k∗R(λ)).
Using the implicit function theorem we can state that:
∂k∗R
∂λ
= −
∂2ΠR
∂k∂λ
∂2ΠR
∂k2
.
From the Second Order Condition (SOC) with respect to k, we know
that:
∂2ΠR
∂k2
= −F (λ)
2
c
< 0,
then, the sign of
∂k∗R
∂λ
will be determined by the second-order mixed deriva-
tive. Differentiating the FOC for k in equation (3.5) with respect to λ we
get:
∂2ΠR
∂k∂λ
=
F (λ)2
c
[
2
f(λ)
F (λ)
(1− λ− k)− 1
]
.
Note that the term in brackets will determine the direction of ∂
2ΠR
∂k∂λ
, and
therefore the direction of
∂k∗R
∂λ
. Particularly, if the second-order mixed deriva-
tive equals zero, then
∂k∗R
∂λ
= 0. Let us now define the max curve Φ(k, λ), as
all the combinations between k and λ, such that ∂
2ΠR
∂k∂λ
= 0.
Φ(k, λ) ≡
[
2
f(λ)
F (λ)
(1− λ− k)− 1
]
= 0. (3.12)
Note that the term inside brackets decreases with capital and liquidity.
Since that k is defined in the [0, 1 − d] range, we look for the levels of
liquidity (λ, λ) such that we lie on Φ(k, λ) for these extreme values of capital.
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This means that, λ and λ satisfy Φ(0, λ) and Φ(1− d, λ) respectively.15 16
Then, for any the combination between (k, λ) that lies above the max
curve, we know that the term in brackets from equation (3.12) will be negative
(just like
∂k∗R
∂λ
). On the other hand, for any combination between (k, λ) that
lies below the max curve, the term inside brackets will be positive (as well
as
∂k∗R
∂λ
).
Given that for low levels of liquidity f(λ)
F (λ)
→ ∞, and using the log-
concavity assumption of f(β), from equation (3.12) we know that
∂k∗R
∂λ
> 0.
Then, for low values of liquidity k∗R(λ) must be below the curve Φ(k, λ).
On the other hand, we know that k∗R(d) > 0 ∀ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ]. In particular,
since λ < d we know that k∗R(λ) > 0. Then, the pair (k
∗
R(λ), λ) will be above
the pair (0, (λ) that belongs to the max curve Φ. Therefore, as we explained
before
∂k∗R
∂λ
< 0.
Then, given that k∗(λ) is a continuous function, there exist a value λˆ
∈ [0, λ] such that Φ(k∗R(λˆ), λˆ), so k∗R reaches a peak at λˆ. Hence, we conclude
that k∗R(λ) is a hump-shaped function of liquidity.
Lemma 4
This lemma states that regulator’s optimal liquidity requirement λ∗R, is a
hump-shaped function of capital. Rearranging equation (3.6), we know that
λ∗R(k) must satisfy:
15In order to guarantee that λ ≤ d, and using equation (3.10), we assume that d ≥
Max
[
f(d)M
M−1+Mf(d) , 1− 0.5f(d)
]
. The first term corresponds to the condition (3.10). In order
to obtain the second term, we set λ equal to d in Φ(0, λ) and solve.
16Rearranging the max curve, we get k = 1−λ− F (λ)2f(λ) . This is a decreasing function of
λ. Furthermore, λ satisfies f(λ)
F (λ)
(1− λ) = 12 and λ satisfies f(λ)F (λ) (d− λ) = 12 , with λ > λ.
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f(λ∗R)
F (λ∗R)
=
(M − 1)(1− λ∗R − k) +M(M(1− λ∗R)− 1 + λ∗R + k)−
c
F (λ∗R)2
(M(1− λ∗R)− 1 + λ∗R + k)(M(1− λ∗R) + 1− λ∗R − k)
,
(3.13)
and from the implicit function theorem:
∂λ∗R(k)
∂k
= −
∂2ΠR
∂k∂λ
∂2ΠR
∂λ2
.
Then, the sign of
∂λ∗R
∂k
is driven by ∂
2ΠR
∂k∂λ
, since from the SOC we know
that ∂
2ΠR
∂λ2
< 0.
To prove this lemma, we need to show that λ∗R(k) intersects the curve
Φ once (equation 3.12). Similar to the proof for lemma 3, whenever λ∗R(k)
is below Φ, we know that ∂
2ΠR
∂k∂λ
> 0. On the other hand, if λ∗R(k) is above
Φ, then ∂
2ΠR
∂k∂λ
< 0. Therefore, ∂
2ΠR
∂k∂λ
= 0 when λ∗R(k) reaches a peak and
intersects Φ.
Given that M has a negative effect on the optimal liquidity (
∂λ∗R
∂M
< 0),
we need to set a lower and upper bound for M (M,M), such that λ∗R(0) < λ
and λ∗R(1− d) > λ. 17 18
The first of these previous conditions (λ∗R(0) < λ) implies that the pair
(k, λ) = (0, λ∗R(0)) is below the curve Φ, and therefore
∂λ∗R(0)
∂k
> 0 (given the
effect on the second-order mixed derivative). The second condition (λ∗R(1−
d) > λ) implies that the pair (k, λ) = ((1 − d), λ∗R(1 − d)) is above Φ, such
that
∂λ∗R(1−d)
∂k
< 0. Then, the continuity of λ∗R(k) guarantees the existence
17Using the implicit function theorem we know that
∂λ∗R(k)
∂M = −
∂2ΠR
∂M∂λ
∂2ΠR
∂λ2
. Given that
∂2ΠR(λ
∗
R)
∂λ2 < 0, the sign of this derivative is determined by
∂2ΠR(λ
∗
R)
∂M∂λ = 2M(1 −
λ∗R)
(
f(λ∗R)
F (λ∗R)
(1− λ∗R)− 1
)
. From (3.13),
f(λ∗R)
F (λ∗R)
(1− λ∗R) < 1. Therefore ∂λ
∗
R(k)
∂M < 0.
18Remember that λ and λ satisfy Φ(1− d, λ) = 0 and Φ(0, λ) = 0, respectively.
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of a k such that λ∗R(kˆ) intersects Φ at least once. Then, we show that these
curves intersect only once for a capital k = kˆ, where λ∗R(kˆ) reaches a peak.
In order to obtain M such that λ = λ∗R(0), we start evaluating equation
(3.13) at k = 0.19 Then, λ∗R(0) satisfies:
f(λ∗R)
F (λ∗R)
=
1
1− λ∗R
− c
(M(1− λ∗R)− 1 + λ∗R + k)(M(1− λ∗R) + 1− λ∗R − k)F (λ∗R)2(1− λ∗R)
⇔ f(λ
∗
R)
F (λ∗R)
(1− λ∗R) = 1−
c
(M(1− λ∗R)− 1 + λ∗R + k)(M(1− λ∗R) + 1− λ∗R − k)F (λ∗R)2
.
Then, using the fact that Φ(0, λ) leads to f(λ)
F (λ)
(1−λ) = 1
2
(from equation
3.12), and replacing λ∗R for λ in the previous expression, we can solve for M ’s
lower bound:
1
2
= 1− c
(M(1− λ)− 1 + λ+ k)(M(1− λ) + 1− λ− k)F (λ)2 ⇔
M =
(
1 +
2c
F (λ¯)(1− λ¯)
)0.5
.
Given that
∂λ∗R
∂M
< 0, we know that for all M > M , λ∗R(0) < λ, and for
low values of k, λ∗R(k) will be an increasing function of capital.
Now, we look for the M such that λ∗R(1 − d) = λ. As before, we use
the fact that Φ(1 − d, λ) leads to f(λ)
F (λ)
(d − λ) = 1
2
(using equation 3.12).
Then, evaluating equation (3.13) at (k, λ) = (1 − d, λ), and using a similar
procedure as for M , we find the upper bound for M :
19For any M higher than M , it is socially optimal to carry out the project.
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M =

(d− λ)2
2
+
c(d− λ)
F (λ)2
(1− λ)(d− λ)− (1− λ)
2
2

0.5
.
Then, for all M < M we know that λ∗R(1 − d) > λ, since ∂λ
∗
R
∂M
< 0.
This fact implies that λ∗R(k) will be a decreasing function of capital when
k → (1− d).
Given that λ∗R(0) < λ, and λ
∗
R(1−d) > λ for all M ∈ (M,M), we use the
fact that λ∗R(k) is a continuous function, to prove the existence of at least
one value of k such that λ∗R(k) intersects Φ.
Now, we will show that these curves only intersect once, i.e. the level of
k for which λ∗R(k) intersects Φ is unique. In order to do that, let us assume
that λ∗R(k) intersects Φ more than once, defining kˆ as the minimum level of k
such that λ∗R(kˆ) intersects Φ(λ
∗
R(kˆ), kˆ). Since λ
∗
R(k) is an increasing function
for low levels of capital, this curve will intersect Φ at k = kˆ from below. If
k = kˆ is not unique, then there should be a value
ˆˆ
k > kˆ such λ∗R(k) intersects
Φ from above, which implies that
∂k∗R
(
ˆˆ
k
)
∂λ
< 0. However, the sign of
∂k∗R
∂λ
is
driven by ∂
2ΠR
∂k∂λ
, which is zero on Φ. This fact implies that λ∗R(k) can not
intersect Φ from above. Hence, these curves have to intersect only once at
the level of capital k = kˆ.
Therefore, λ∗R(k) is an increasing function for any k < kˆ, it reaches a peak
at k = kˆ, and it decreases for any k > kˆ. Hence, we can conclude that λ∗R(k)
is a hump-shaped function of k.
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Proposition 2
In this section, we prove that the cost of capital determines the degree of sub-
stitutability/complementarity between the optimal requirements on capital
and liquidity. These tools are complements if the regulator’s optimal policy
given by the pair (k∗R, λ
∗
R), is below the curve Φ, and substitutes if (k
∗
R, λ
∗
R)
lies above Φ. Note that the pair (k∗R, λ
∗
R) corresponds to the intersection
between two parametric curves (k∗R(λ), λ) and (k, λ
∗
R(k)).
20
It is noteworthy the fact that the cost of capital ρ only affects k∗R(λ), but
does not have any effect on λ∗R(k). For instance, a reduction in ρ produces
a parallel upward shift of k∗R(λ), but it does not affect λ
∗
R(k). Then, as we
change ρ the new equilibrium will remain on the original curve (k, λ∗R(k)).
Since this change is continuum in ρ, we show that for a value ρ regulator’s
optimal policy (k∗R, λ
∗
R) will be above Φ. On the other hand, for ρ0 regulator’s
choice (k0, λ
∗
R(k0)) will be below Φ. This implies that, there exist a value
ρ = ρˆ ∈ (ρ, ρ0) such that λ∗R(k) and k∗R(λ) intersect, and this intersection
occurs on the curve Φ.
First, we show that for ρ = ρ, regulator’s optimal policy (k∗R, λ
∗
R) is above
Φ. In the proof of lemma 3, we define the lower bound of ρ = ρ such that
k∗R(λ; ρ) intersects Φ exactly at the pair (k, λ) = (1− d, λ). This means that
k∗R(λ; ρ) is above Φ for any λ > λ. In particular, the pairs A = (1 − d, λ)
and B = (k∗R(d; ρ), d) lie on the parametric curve (k
∗
R(λ; ρ), λ), where d is the
upper bound for liquidity and k∗R(d; ρ) > 0.
On the other hand, from Lemma 4 we know that λ∗R(k) intersects Φ at kˆ,
20For all the combinations (k, λ) below Φ, the second order mixed-derivative is positive,
i.e. ∂
2ΠR
∂k∂λ > 0. This means that increasing increasing capital and liquidity will increase
welfare, i.e. both requirements are complements. On the other hand, for any pair (k, λ)
above Φ, we know that ∂
2ΠR
∂k∂λ < 0. Hence, increasing capital (or liquidity) should be
accompanied by a decrease in liquidity (or capital). This means that the regulatory tools
are substitutes.
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and λ < λ∗R(1−d) < λ. Then, for a level of capital k∗R(d; ρ) we know that the
corresponding optimal liquidity is λ∗R(k
∗(d; ρ)) < λ. In particular, the pairs
C = (1− d, λ∗R(1− d)) and D = (k∗R(d; ρ), λ∗R(k∗(d; ρ))) lie on the parametric
curve (k;λ∗R(k)).
Now, let us compare the combinations A and C. We observe that the
parametric curve (k;λ∗R(k)) is above of (k
∗
R(λ; ρ), λ). Comparing the combi-
nations B and D we observe that (k;λ∗R(k)) is below the parametric curve
(k∗R(λ; ρ), λ). Then, the continuity of these parametric curves guarantees that
they intersect above Φ, so that capital and liquidity are substitutes.21
Then, from lemma 4 we know that capital is low the curve λ∗R(λ) is below
Φ. In particular, assume that the pair (k0, λ
∗
R(k0)) lies below Φ. Then, it
is possible to find a value of ρ0, such that (k
∗(λ), λ) intersects (k, λ∗R(k)) at
(k0, λ
∗
R(k)). This implies that liquidity and capital instrument are comple-
ments. If we evaluate equation (3.11) at λ0 (which leads to the corresponding
k0 = k
∗
R(λ0)), we can solve for ρ0:
ρ0 =
(1− λ∗R(k0)− k0)F (λ∗R(k0))2
c
+ 1 > 1.
We find that for ρ capital and liquidity are substitutes, while for ρ0 they
are complements. Since changes in ρ produce a continuous parallel shift of
k∗R(λ), then there exist a value of ρ = ρˆ ∈ (ρ, ρ0) such that (k, λ∗R(k)) and
(k∗R(λ), λ) intersect on the curve Φ. This means that for ρ < ρˆ, (k
∗
R(λ), λ)
intersects (k, λ∗R(k)) above Φ, while for any ρ > ρˆ, (k
∗
R(λ), λ) intersects
(k, λ∗R(k)) below Φ. Then, we can conclude that the cost of capital deter-
mines the degree of substitutability/complementarity between requirements
on capital and liquidity.
21Remember that k∗R(λ; ρ) is above Φ for all λ > λ.
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Proposition 3
In order to prove that θL(λ) is a hump-shaped function of λ, we proceed like
in the proof for Proposition (1). Differentiating θL(λ) with respect to λ we
obtain:
∂θ∗L
∂λ
=
1−M + ∫ d
λ
(ρL − 1)f(β)dβ
c
⇔ 1−M + (1− F (λ))(ρL − 1)
c
,
Note that
∂θ∗L
∂λ
is positive when λ → 0, and negative when λ → d. The
monotonicity of
∂θ∗L
∂λ
guarantees that it reaches the value zero once. Hence,
θL(λ) is a hump-shaped function.
In order to prove that monitoring effort will be higher if there is a LoLR,
we analyze the difference θL(λ)− θb(λ):
θL(λ)− θb(λ) =
(1− F (λ) (M(1− λ)− 1 + λ+ k))− ∫ d
λ
(ρL − 1)(β − λ)f(β)dβ
c
⇔
=
∫ d
λ
M(1− λ)− 1 + λ+ k)− (ρL − 1)(β − λ)f(β)dβ
c
> 0,
given that M < ρL <
M
d
. Since the bank chooses the level of liquidity
that maximizes its level of monitoring, then it is straightforward that a bank
that receives support from a LoLR will choose a higher level of monitoring.
Proposition 4
This proposition states that, if there is a regulator acting as a LoLR, increas-
ing liquidity will lead to a lower capital requirement. Let us start analyzing
the FOC for capital:
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[k] : k∗(λ) = 1− λ− c(ρ− 1) + ρL
∫ d
λ
(β − λ)f(β)dβ.
If we differentiate this expression with respect to liquidity:
∂k∗(λ)
∂λ
= −1− ρL
∫ d
λ
f(β)dβ < 0.
Then, these regulatory tools are substitutes.
Lemma 5
In order to show that bank’s liquidity choice is increasing in L (representing
the liquidation cost for the long term asset), we use the implicit function
theorem and find that:
∂λFS
∂L
=
[
F (β − F (λFS)
]
M + f(β)
M(L− 1)
ML− 1 > 0,
which is what we wanted to show.
Proposition 5
Similar to previous cases, in order to prove that liquidity maximizes moni-
toring effort (in the presence of a systemic shock and uncorrelated loans) one
can simply compare the bank’s FOCs with respect to θ and λ. Additionally,
comparing the monitoring effort with systemic shocks with the monitoring
in the baseline scenario (θSR and θb) it is straightforward that θSR < θb.
In order to show that θSR is a hump-shaped function, we analyze the
derivative of monitoring with respect to liquidity:
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∂θSR
∂λ
=
∫ 2
γ
{f(λ) [γM(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)] + F (λ)(1−Mγ)g(γ)dγ}
c
⇔∫ 2
γ
{
f(λ)
F (λ)
[γM(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)] g(γ)dγ + ∫ 2
γ
(1−Mγ)
}
g(γ)dγ
c
The log-concavity assumption implies that for low levels of λ this expres-
sion is positive (since f(λ)
F (λ)
is large). On the other hand, for higher levels of
liquidity (when λ→ d) the condition 3.10 guarantees that the above expres-
sion becomes negative. Hence, because of the continuity of the function, we
can assert that θSR is a hump-shaped function of λ.
Finally, in order to show that liquidity is higher in the presence of a
systemic shock (compared to the baseline model), let us restate the FOC
with respect to liquidity as follows:
[λ] : f(λ) [E(γ)M(1− λ)− (1− k − λ)] + F (λ)(1−ME(γ)) = 0
Note that this expression resembles the one from the baseline model
(equation 3.3). The only difference is that the long term project’s return
M is multiplied by E(γ), which equals one.
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